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Abstract
We combine forward investment performance processes and ambiguity averse portfolio selec-
tion. We introduce the notion of robust forward criteria which addresses the issues of ambiguity
in model specification as well as in preferences and investment horizon specification. It describes
the evolution of dynamically–consistent ambiguity averse preferences.
We first focus on establishing dual characterizations of the robust forward criteria. This
is advantageous as the dual problem amounts to a search for an infimum whereas the primal
problem features a saddle-point. Our approach is based on ideas developed in Schied [71] and
Zˇitkovic´ [79]. We then study in detail non-volatile criteria. In particular, we solve explicitly the
example of an investor who starts with a logarithmic utility and applies a quadratic penalty
function. The investor builds a dynamic estimate of the market price of risk λˆ and updates
her stochastic utility in accordance with the so-perceived elapsed market opportunities. We
show that this leads to a time-consistent optimal investment policy given by a fractional Kelly
strategy associated with λˆ. The leverage is proportional to the investor’s confidence in her
estimate λˆ.
1 Introduction
This paper is a contribution to optimal investment as a problem of normative decisions under
uncertainty. This topic is central to financial economics and mathematical finance, and the relevant
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2body of research is large and diverse. Within it, the expected utility maximisation (EUM), with its
axiomatic foundation going back to von Neumann and Morgenstern [77] and Savage [69], is probably
the most widely used and extensively studied framework. In continuous time optimal portfolio
selection it was first explored in Merton [59]. The resulting problem considers maximisation of
expected utility of terminal wealth:
max
pi
EP [U(X
pi
T )] ,
where P is the so-called historical probability measure, T the trading horizon, and U(·) the investor’s
utility at T .
Drawbacks of the classical EUM framework. Despite the popularity of the above model,
there has been a considerable amount of criticism of the model fundamentals (P, T, U), for these
inputs might be ambiguous, inflexible and difficult to specify. Firstly, an investor faces a significant
ambiguity as to which market model to use, specifically, how to determine the probability measure
P. This is often referred to as the Knightian uncertainty, in reference to the original contribution of
Knight [53]. Introduction of ambiguity aversion axiom, motivated by Ellsberg [27] paradox, led to
generalised robust EUM paradigm in Gilboa and Schmeidler [36]. It built on earlier contributions,
including Anscombe and Aumann [3] and Schmeidler [73], and has since been followed and extended
by a large number of works; we refer the reader to Maccheroni et al. [57], Schied [71] and to Fo¨llmer,
Schied and Weber [33] and the references therein for an overview.
Secondly, the investment horizon T might not be fixed and/or a priori known. Such situations arise,
for example, in investment problems with rolling horizons or problems in which the horizon needs to
be modified due to inflow of new funds, new market opportunities, or new investment options and
obligations. One of the issues related to flexible trading horizons is under which model conditions
and preference structure one could extend the standard investment problem beyond a pre-specified
horizon in a time-consistent manner. This question was recently examined by Ka¨llblad [47]. The
flexibility of investment horizon is also directly related to utilities that are not biased by the horizon
choice. The concept of horizon-unbiased utilities was introduced by Henderson and Hobson [39];
see also Choulli et al. [14].
Thirdly, there are various issues with regards to the elucidation, specification and choice of the utility
function. Covering all existing works is beyond the scope herein and we only refer to representative
lines of research. Firstly, the concept of utility per se might be quite elusive and one should look
for different, more pragmatic criteria to use in order to quantify the risk preferences of the investor.
We refer the reader to an old note of F. Black [9] where the criterion is the choice of the optimal
portfolio, see also He and Huang [37] and Cox, Hobson and Ob lo´j [15], and to Sharpe [74] and Monin
[60] where the criterion is a targeted wealth distribution. Another line of research accepts the utility
as an appropriate device to rank outcomes but challenges the classical EUM, for empirical evidence
shows that investors feel differently with respect to gains and losses. Among others, see, Hershey
and Schoemaker [42] and Kahneman and Tversky [45]. This prompted further ramifications and
led to the development of the area of behavioural finance (see, among others, Barberis [5] and Jin
and Zhou [44]). A third line generalises the concept of utility and moves away from a terminal-
horizon deterministic utility, as U(·) above, by allowing state- and path-dependence. One of the best
known paradigm are the recursive utilities, see, among others, [22, 26, 76]. They alleviate several
drawbacks of their standard counterparts and have been widely used. State-dependent utilities
have been also considered before in static frameworks (see, for example, [21, 50, 51]). A new family
of state-dependent utilities are the so-called forward investment performance processes, recently
3introduced by Musiela and Zariphopoulou [63, 64]. Their key property is that they are created
forward in time. They are stochastic processes U(·, T ) which are defined for all time horizons and
thus alleviate the horizon inflexibility. More importantly, they are flexible enough to incorporate
changing market opportunities, investors views, benchmarked performance, stochastically involved
risk appetite and risk aversion volatility, and specification of present utility rather than utility in
the (possibly remote) future. We refer the reader to Musiela and Zariphopoulou [63, 64] for an
overview of the topic.
Our motivation and objective. Our work herein was motivated by the above considerations
of the triplet of model inputs (P, T, U). We propose a framework that addresses simultaneously
the above drawbacks and combines elements of the robust EUM and the forward performance
approaches presented above.
Specifically, we consider an investor who invests in a stochastic market in which she does not know
the “true” model, nor even if such a true model exists. Instead, she describes the market reality
through relative weighting of stochastic models with some models being more likely than the others,
some being excluded all together, etc. These views are expressed by a penalty function and are
updated dynamically with time. The investor’s personal evaluation of wealth is expressed through
her utility function. We adopt the axiomatic approach to normative decisions which implies that,
when considering a given investment horizon, say T , the investor aims to maximise the robust
expected utility functional, as in Maccheroni et al. [57] and Schied [71]. We then generalise this
criterion by considering a stochastic extension, which is defined for all investment horizons.
We combine the classical approaches to Knightian uncertainty and robust utility maximisation with
forward investment performance criteria. These criteria evolve forward in time in contradistinction
with the existing ones, which are pre-specified up to a certain horizon and are generated back-
wards using the Dynamic Programming Principle. Such dynamic-consistency, otherwise known as
the self-generation property, see Zˇitkovic´ [79] and Zariphopoulou and Zˇitkovic´ [78]), is a natural
property linked to optimality both in robust and model-specific EUM. In contrast, it needs to be
imposed in the forward investment framework. It is in fact the fundamental element in their very
definition.
Main contribution. We investigate pairs of utility fields and penalty functions which are dy-
namically consistent. Such pairs encode stochastic preferences evolving forward in time and taking
account of model ambiguity. Accordingly, we call them robust forward criteria. Our contribution
is twofold. First, our theoretical focus is on defining and further characterising the new investment
criteria. We consider their duals and establish an appropriate duality result by combining ideas
developed in Schied [71] and Zˇitkovic´ [79]. As it is the case in existing works, the study of the dual
(robust forward) problem offers various advantages. In particular, in the case of robust preferences
the dual problem amounts to the search for an infimum whereas the primal problem features a
saddle-point. We use the dual formulation to study the question of time-consistency of the optimal
strategies. We show that in general, both in our framework as well as in the classical robust EUM,
the optimal strategies may fail to be time-consistent. This is caused by possibly arbitrary dynamics
of the penalty functions. We show that time-consistency of the optimal strategies is guaranteed
under suitable assumptions of dynamic-consistency of the penalty functions.
Second, we construct a specific example and solve it explicitly. Namely, we consider an investor who
starts with a logarithmic utility and applies a quadratic penalty function. Naturally, our solution
shows that family of robust forward criteria is non-empty. More importantly, this example offers a
4theoretical justification and explanation to strategies often followed by large investors in practice.
Specifically, the investor aims at building a dynamic estimate of the market price of risk, say λˆ, and
updates her stochastic utility in accordance with the so-perceived elapsed market opportunities.
We show that this leads to a time-consistent optimal investment policy given by a (time-consistent)
fractional Kelly strategy associated with λˆ. The leverage is a function of investor’s confidence in
the estimate λˆ.
Structure of the paper. The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the market model is
specified and the notion of robust forward criteria is introduced. In Section 3, equivalent dual char-
acterizations of robust forward criteria are established. We also discuss natural examples of penalty
functions, including ones associated with risk measures, and link between dynamic-consistency of
penalty functions and time-consistency of optimal investment strategies. Then, in Section 4, work-
ing within a Brownian filtration, we study specific classes and examples of robust forward criteria.
Our main example is developed in Section 4.1 where we show how non-volatile logarithmic pref-
erences lead to fractional Kelly strategies. We then discuss a simple example of criteria leading
to time inconsistent optimal investment strategies. The remainder of the section is devoted to a,
mostly formal, discussion of various classes of criteria. Our aim is to illustrate the flexibility of the
notion and the fact that interesting preferences might be identified under additional evolutionary
requirements. In particular, non-volatile criteria are linked to a specific PDE which, formally, is
discussed in further detail. Finally, we argue that for each robust forward criterion, there exists
a specific (standard) forward criterion in the reference market, giving rise to the same optimal
behaviour. Most of the proofs are deferred to Section 5.
2 The market model and the robust forward criterion
2.1 The market model and notation
The market consists of d + 1 securities whose prices (S0;S) = (S0t , S
1
t , ..., S
d
t )t∈[0,∞) are modeled
as a (d + 1)-dimensional ca`dla`g semi-martingale on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P), where
the filtration F = (Ft)t∈[0,∞) satisfies the usual conditions. We let S
0 ≡ 1 and assume S to be
locally bounded. An F-predictable process π = (πt)t∈[0,∞) is said to be an admissible portfolio if π
is S-integrable on [0, T ] for each T > 0. The associated wealth-process Xpi is given by
Xpit =
∫ t
0
πudSu, t ≥ 0.
The set of admissible portfolio processes available to the investor is denoted by A. It is further
specified below for the different cases we consider.
For each T > 0,MeT denotes the set of equivalent local martingale measures. That is to say, the set
of measures Q on FT such that Q ∼ P|FT and each component of S is a Q–local martingale. Simi-
larly, MaT denotes the set of absolutely continuous local martingale measures. The corresponding
sets of density processes are denoted respectively by ZeT and Z
a
T ,
ZeT =
{
Z =
dQ
dP|FT
: Q ∈ MeT
}
5and similarly for ZaT . Following [79], we assume that the set M
e
T is non-empty for each T > 0.
This assumption is referred to as the absence of arbitrage (FLVR) on finite horizons; see Section 2
in [79] for further discussion. Note that while
MeT1 = {Q|FT1 : Q ∈M
e
T2}, for all 0 ≤ T1 ≤ T2,
there might not exist a set Me of probability measures equivalent to P such that MeT = {Q|FT :
Q ∈Me}, for all T > 0.
As argued in [79], the condition of NFLVR on finite horizons implies that, for each Q ∈ MeT , the
density process ZQt = E
[
dQ
dP|FT
|Ft
]
, t ∈ [0, T ], might be extended to a strictly positive martingale
(Zt)t∈[0,∞) such that Z0 = 1 and ZS is a local martingale. The set of all such processes Z
will be denoted by Ze. In particular, NFLVR on finite horizons holds if and only if Ze is non-
empty. Furthermore, if the condition of strict positivity is replaced by the one of non-negativity,
the obtained family is denoted by Za. For any Q ≪ P, we use the notation ZQt,T := Z
Q
T /Z
Q
t , with
the convention that ZQt,T ≡ 1 on {Z
Q
t = 0}.
2.2 Robust forward performance criteria
We introduce the new concept of robust forward criteria. These performance criteria combine two
elements: a utility random field U(ω, x, t), t ≥ 0, and a family of penalty functions γt,T (Q), for
0 ≤ t ≤ T and T ≥ 0. U(ω, ·, t) models the utility of investor at time t and may depend on the past
(ωs)s≤t. The investor faces ambiguity about the “true model” for dynamics of financial assets and
forms a view about the relative plausibility of different probability measures. This is reflected in
γt,T (Q)(ω) which gives the weighting of measure Q on FT . Both U and γ are combined in making
investment decisions. We define both separately before turning to the crucial consistency condition
which defines a robust forward criteria couple (U, γ).
Definition 2.1. For a fixed a ∈ {0,∞}, a random field is a mapping U : Ω× (−a,∞)× [0,∞)→
R, which is measurable with respect to the product of the optional σ-algebra on Ω × [0,∞) and
B
(
(−a,∞)
)
. A utility random field is a random field which satisfies the following conditions:
i) For all t ∈ [0,∞), the mapping x→ U(ω, x, t) is P-a.s. a strictly concave and strictly increas-
ing C1(R)-function which satisfies the Inada conditions
lim
x→−a
∂
∂x
U(ω, x, t) =∞, lim
x→∞
∂
∂x
U(ω, x, t) = 0,
ii) For all x ∈ (−a,∞), the mapping t→ U(ω, x, t) is ca`dla`g on [0,∞),
iii) For each x ∈ (−a,∞) and T ∈ [0,∞), U(·, x, T ) ∈ L1(FT ).
For a given utility random field, a set of strategies A is said to be feasible, if for all π ∈ A and
t > 0, Xpit ∈ (−a,∞), a.s. In what follows, we suppress ω from the notation and simply write U(x, t).
Definition 2.2. For given t ≤ T <∞, a mapping γt,T : Ω× {Q ∼ P|FT } → R+ ∪ {∞}, is called a
penalty function if
6i) γt,T is Ft-measurable,
ii) Q→ γt,T (Q) is convex a.s,
iii) for κ ∈ L∞+ (Ft), Q→ E[κγt,T (Q)] is weakly lower semicontinuous on {Q ∼ P|FT }.
Moreover, for a given utility random field U(x, t) and feasible set of strategies A, we say that
(γt,T ), 0 ≤ t ≤ T < ∞, is an admissible family of penalty functions if for all T > 0 and π ∈ A,
EQ[U(XpiT , T )] is well defined in R∪{∞} for all Q ∈ Qt,T , t ≤ T , where Qt,T is the set of measures
on FT given by
Qt,T := {Q ∼ P|FT and γt,T (Q) <∞ a.s.} . (1)
In the above definition, Qt,T is the set of feasible measures considered at time t when investing
over [t, T ]. It may depend on t and T but is non-random. Both larger and smaller sets could be
used, e.g. the (random) set of measures Q with γt,T (Q)(ω) < ∞ or the set of measures Q with
E
[
γt,T (Q)
]
< ∞. However, for many natural penalty functions, these different choices lead to the
same value function, see Section 3.4 below. Finally, note that we do not impose any regularity or
consistency assumptions on γt,T (Q) in the time variables. These are not necessary for the abstract
results in Section 3 and will be introduced later when they appear naturally, see Assumption
2.
We are now ready to introduce the robust forward criteria. As highlighted above, these are couples
(U, γ) which exhibit a dynamic-consistency akin to dynamic programming principle.
Definition 2.3. Let U be a utility random field, A a feasible set of strategies and γ an admissible
family of penalty functions. Then, the value field associated with U , A and γ is a family of mappings
{u(·; t, T ) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T <∞}, with u(·; t, T ) : L∞(Ft)→ L0(Ft;R ∪ {∞}) given by
u(ξ; t, T ) := ess sup
pi∈A
ess inf
Q∈Qt,T
{
EQ
[
U
(
ξ +
∫ T
t
πsdSs, T
)∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+ γt,T (Q)
}
, for ξ ∈ L∞(Ft). (2)
For a given set of feasible strategies, we say that the combination of a utility random field and a
family of penalty functions is a robust forward criterion if
U(ξ, t) = u(ξ; t, T ) a.s., (3)
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T <∞ and all ξ ∈ L∞(Ft).
We note that the above definition is well posed. Indeed, given the assumptions on U and γ, the
conditional expectations in (2) are well-defined (extended valued) random variables (see e.g. Prop
18.1.5 in [75] or p. 113 in [38] for the definition of conditional expectations of quasi-integrable
random variables). As all Q ∈ Qt,T are equivalent to P, it also holds for each π ∈ A that the
essential infimum is well-defined (extended-valued) with respect to the reference measure P.
Optimisation in (2) fits within the robust EUM paradigm. Its use to make investment decisions was
considered, for a fixed horizon t ∈ [0, T ], in [71]. It is based on an axiomatic characterisation of risk
and ambiguity averse preferences and their numerical representation as concave monetary utility
functionals in Maccheroni et al. [57], and the robust representation thereof derived in Fo¨llmer and
Schied [32]. Equation (3) provides a direct extension of the notion of self-generating utility fields
studied in [79] and, consequently, of the notion of forward performance criteria as discussed in the
7Introduction, see also Section 4. Accordingly, we sometimes refer to a robust forward criteria (U, γ)
as being self-generating or dynamically-consistent. To relate (3) to the more classical dynamic
programming principle, note that when applied together with the definition (2) it yields
u(ξ, t, T ) = U(ξ, t) = u(ξ, t, r) = ess sup
pi∈A
ess inf
Q∈Qt,r
{
EQ
[
U
(
ξ +
∫ r
t
πsdSs, r
)∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+ γt,r(Q)
}
= ess sup
pi∈A
ess inf
Q∈Qt,r
{
EQ
[
u
(
ξ +
∫ r
t
πsdSs, r, T
)∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+ γt,r(Q)
}
, 0 ≤ t ≤ r ≤ T,
(4)
for ξ ∈ L∞(Ft).
To the best of our knowledge (2) corresponds to the most general robust EUM setting which has
been previously considered for optimal investment decisions. However we note that this setup
has its limitations. For example, the penalty associated to a given measure, γt,T (Q), is fixed and
independent of wealth. This has important implications for time-consistency of optimal investment
strategies. We show below in Proposition 3.7 that when (γt,T ) are dynamically consistent, and if
we have saddle points (πt,T ,Qt,T ) solving (2), then Qt,r = Qt,T |Fr , t ≤ r ≤ T , and also the optimal
investment strategies are time-consistent. However, in all generality we could have (dynamically
consistent) robust forward criteria which lead to time inconsistent optimal strategies. An example is
given in Section 4.2. Independence of γt,T (Q) from investor’s wealth is also contrary to the empirical
evidence, as discussed in behavioural finance, see e.g. Kahneman and Tversky [45], which points
to the importance of investor’s reference point for judging scenarios. In consequence, we believe it
might be interesting to study generalisations of the problem in (2). Within the framework of robust
EUM, these are possible using quasi-concave utility functionals introduced in Cerreia-Vioglio et al.
[12]. Their use for (classical) optimal investment problem is being investigated in a parallel paper,
see Ka¨llblad [48].
The set of admissible strategies A is specified below for the respective cases we consider. Note that
the definition of robust forward criteria does not require existence of optimal investment strategies.
In that aspect we follow the approach in [79] rather than the original definition (cf. [63, 64])
which required the optimum to be attained. As argued below (cf. Section 3), this flexibility is of
particular use for the study of robust forward criteria defined on the entire real line1. In Section 4
we consider a robust forward criterion of logarithmic type for which the existence of an optimizer
is established.
3 Dual characterization of robust forward criteria
Dual methods are well known to be useful for the study of optimal investment problems. For the
standard utility maximization problem, they are particularly useful for proving existence of and
characterizing the optimal strategy for the primal problem. As we will see below, in our setup there
are also clear benefits in passing to the dual domain, even though our focus is on the evolution of
the preferences themselves rather than on the optimal strategy. Here the dual problem amounts to
a search for an infimum whereas the primal problem features a saddle-point. In consequence, the
robust forward criteria are easier to characterize in the dual rather than the primal domain. The
1For further remarks on the flexibility obtained with this approach, we refer to Remark 3.8 in [79].
8aim of this section is to establish such equivalent characterizations. We adopt a convenient set of
assumptions with possible extensions discussed in Remarks 3.4 and 3.5 below.
3.1 Self-generation in the dual domain
We develop the duality theory for utility random fields which are finite on the entire real line. To
this end, we set for Definitions 2.1 and 2.3
a =∞ and A = Abd,
where Abd denotes the set of all portfolios producing bounded wealth-processes. Specifically, Abd =
A¯ ∩ (−A¯), where A¯ is the set of all admissible portfolio processes for which, for any T > 0, there
exists a constant c > 0 such that Xpit ≥ −c, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , a.s. The restriction to bounded wealth
processes implies that, for many utility fields, the supremum will not be attained. However, this is
not really restrictive2.
The reason for developing the duality theory for utility random fields finite on the entire real line,
is twofold. First, we complement the work of Schied [71], since our results are related and therein
only utilities defined on the positive half-line are considered. Second, considering utilities finite on
the entire real line simplifies certain aspects of the duality theory. This fact is also exploited in,
among others, [34]. What usually becomes more complex when allowing for negative wealth, is the
definition of an appropriate set of admissible strategies yielding the existence of an optimizer3 (cf.
[68, 70]). However, as argued above, for the present purposes it suffices to restrict to the set of
bounded wealth processes Abd. In consequence, we may fully benefit from the simplifications of this
setup without any further complexity being imposed. While analogous results could be pursued for
utilities defined on the half-line, it would imply additional technicalities and we leave it for future
research (cf. Remark 3.2 in [79]).
For a given utility random field U , the associated dual random field V : Ω× [0,∞)× (0,∞)→ R,
is given by
V (y, t) = sup
x∈R
(
U(x, t)− xy
)
for t ≥ 0, y ≥ 0. (5)
The dual value field and the notion of self-generation in the dual domain are then naturally defined
as follows.
Definition 3.1. For y > 0 and 0 ≤ t < T < ∞ the dual value field v(·; t, T ) : L0+(Ft) →
L0(Ft;R ∪ {∞}), is given by
v(η; t, T ) := ess inf
Q∈Qt,T
ess inf
Z∈ZaT
{
EQ
[
V
(
ηZt,T /Z
Q
t,T , T
) ∣∣∣Ft]+ γt,T (Q)}. (6)
2Indeed, the utility field defined on the entire real line does not possess any singularities (cf. Assumption 1
below). The value field defined with respect to a more general (but feasible) set of admissible strategies would
therefore coincide with the one defined with respect to bounded strategies. Definition 2.3 would still apply, since
the notion of robust forward criteria is a consistency requirement placed on the preferences themselves, without a
reference to an optimal strategy. In consequence, for utility fields defined on the entire real line, robust forward
criteria may be studied and characterized without exactly specifying the domain of optimization.
3Within the present framework where the preferences are not only finite on the entire real line but in addition
to that stochastic, the exact specification of a feasible set of admissible, but not necessarily bounded, strategies is
highly non-trivial.
9The combination of a dual random field V and a family of penalty functions γ is said to be self-
generating or dynamically consistent if
V (η, t) = v(η; t, T ), a.s.,
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T <∞ and all η ∈ L0+(Ft).
3.2 Equivalence between primal and dual robust self-generation
We first introduce the following technical assumption:
Assumption 1. For each T > 0 and 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the set Qt,T is convex and weakly compact and
the set {ZU−(x, T ) : Z ∈ Qt,T } is UI, for all x ∈ R. Furthermore, if κ ∈ L∞+ (Ft) and Q ∈ Qt,T
are such that κZQt,TU(x, T ) ∈ L
1, for all x ∈ R, then
U˜(x, T ) := 11{κ=0}U(x, T ) + 11{κ>0}Z
Q
t,TU(x, T ), x ∈ R, (7)
satisfies the non-singularity Assumption 3.3 in [79].
The above implies that U(x, t) itself satisfies the non-singularity assumption. For further discussion
of this concept, we refer to Remark 3.4 in [79]. Given that the setQt,T is weakly compact, a sufficient
condition for Assumption 1 to hold, is that U(x, t) is (x, ω)-uniformly bounded from below by a
deterministic utility function. Then, it also trivially holds that any family of penalty functions
is admissible. Note also that, due to convexity, the weak compactness of Qt,T is equivalent to
closedness in L0 (cf. Lemma 3.2 in [72]).
Next, we present the first main result, which yields the conjugacy relations between the functions
u(x; t, T ) and v(y; t, T ). We stress that even for t = 0, Theorem 3.2 differs from Theorem 2.4 in
[71] in that the utility function is defined on the entire real line and is also allowed to be stochastic.
Moreover, we do not impose any finiteness assumptions on the involved value fields.
Theorem 3.2. Let U(x, t), t ≥ 0, be a utility random field, γt,T an admissible family of penalty
functions and V (y, t) the associated dual random field. Assume that Assumption 1 holds.
Then, for all ξ ∈ L∞(Ft), η ∈ L0+(Ft) and 0 ≤ t ≤ T <∞, the following assertions hold,
u(ξ; t, T ) = ess inf
η∈L0
+
(Ft)
(
v(η; t, T ) + ξη
)
a.s. (8)
and
v(η; t, T ) = ess sup
ξ∈L∞(Ft)
(
u(ξ; t, T )− ξη
)
a.s. (9)
In consequence, the combination of a utility random field U(x, t) and a family of penalty functions
γt,T is self-generating, if and only if, the combination of the dual random field V (y, t) and γt,T is
self-generating.
The proof of Theorem 3.2 is given in Section 5.2 and is based on combining ideas introduced in
[71] and [79], respectively. In the former paper, duality results for the robust utility maximization
problem with variational preferences were established. In the latter, in a setting similar to ours,
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conditional conjugacy relations were established for the non-robust case. Specifically, we reduce
the conditional case to an F0-measurable conjugacy relation by taking expectations. For the latter,
the relevant assertions are proven using arguments similar to the ones in [71]. However, while [71]
relies on the duality results in [54], we here make use of the theory established in [79].
As holds for the case of a fixed measure (cf. [79]), the dual problem admits a solution even though
the primal problem may not (due to the restriction to bounded strategies). The fact that the opti-
mizer’s second component is in MaT (as opposed to a larger set of finitely additive measures) is a
consequence of the utility function being finite on the entire real line (see [79] and also [6, 70]).
Proposition 3.3. Let V (y, t) be a dual random field such that Assumption 1 holds for the associated
primal field. Then, for each η ∈ L0+ and t ≤ T < ∞, there exist Q ∈ Qt,T and Z ∈ Z
a
T for which
the infimum in the dual value function v(η; t, T ) is attained (cf. (6)).
We remind the reader that the above results use that the set of measures Qt,T , defined in (1), is
assumed to be weakly compact. We end this section with some remarks on possible further exten-
sions in the definition and assumptions imposed on Qt,T .
Remark 3.4. Theorem 3.2 can be proven under the assumption that Qat,T is weakly compact, where
Qat,T is the set of absolutely continuous measures for which the penalty is finite a.s. For example,
this holds for all penalty functions associated with coherent risk measures continuous from below (see
Section 3.4). The result then holds with the set Qt,T replaced by Q
a
t,T in the definition of u(·; t, T )
but with the dual field still defined as above with respect to the equivalent measures. In order to use
Qat,T in the definition of v(·; t, T ), one would need to extend the definition of Z
QV (η/ZQ) to the
null-sets of Q in a suitable way (preserving lower semicontinuity). For the case of utility functions
defined on R+, this was done in [71]. The present case requires a more careful treatment which
is the focus of future research. Extending the definition of the dual problem to a set of absolutely
continuous measures would also enable proving Proposition 3.3 using the weak compactness of the
level sets (cf. Remark 3.5) rather than of Qat,T .
Remark 3.5. In [71], for the case of positive wealth processes and a fixed time horizon, similar
conjugacy relations to (8) and (9) were established without the compactness assumption on Qt,T .
The proof exploited instead weak compactness of the level-sets Q(c) := {Q ≪ P : γ0,T (Q) ≤ c}.
Specifically, since U(ε+XT ), XT ≥ 0, is uniformly bounded from below for that case, the infimum
in
sup
pi
inf
Q≪P
{
EQ [U (ε+XpiT )] + γ0,T (Q)
}
,
can be replaced by the infimum over some (weakly compact) level set Q(c), c > 0. After application
of a minmax theorem, the result is then obtained by letting ε go to zero. Since we consider U :
R → R, the arguments become more involved. Indeed, even for t = 0, U(x, T ) deterministic and
πn an optimizing sequence, it is not clear whether E[U(X
pin
T , T )] is bounded from below. To address
such issues, besides extending the setting from equivalent measures and define the dual problem for
absolutely continuous measures, one might have to adopt the more elaborate setup considered in [70]
where the existence of an optimizer for utility functions defined on the entire real line is proven by
defining a sequence of utility functions Un, for each of which the problem is reduced to one defined
on the half-line. The result is then obtained by a limiting procedure. We leave these problems for
future research.
11
3.3 Dynamic-consistency of penalty functions and time-consistency of
the optimal investment strategies
The definition of robust forward criteria requires the combined criterion consisting of U(x, t) and
γ(·) to be dynamically consistent (cf. Definition 2.3). In this section we further investigate this
assumption and relate it to the dynamic consistency of the penalty functions and the optimal
investment strategies. The proofs of the results in this section are reported in Section 5.2.
We introduce the following class of dynamically consistent penalty functions:
Assumption 2. For any T > 0 and Q ∼ P on FT , the family of penalty functions (γt,T ) is ca`dla`g
in t ≤ T , γt,t ≡ 0 and
γs,T (Q) = γs,t(Q|Ft) + E
Q [γt,T (Q)| Fs] , s ≤ t ≤ T. (10)
Moreover, Q˜s,T = Qs,T , where
Q˜s,T :=
{
Q ∼ P|FT : Z
Q
T = Z
Q0
t Z
Q1
t,T ,Q0 ∈ Qs,t,Q1 ∈ Qt,T , s ≤ t ≤ T
}
. (11)
We note that the above property of stability under pasting (11) is not implied by (10). In order
to render the analysis tractable, we work under this stronger assumption. For remarks on the
relation of the above properties to penalty functions associated with risk measures, see Section 3.4
below.
The additional structure resulting from Assumption 2 allows us to consider the question of whether,
for T > 0 fixed, the value field u(x, t;T ) associated with a general utility field, is itself self-generating
for t ≤ T . That is to say, whether the dynamic programming principle holds (cf. (4)). We verify
now that under suitable assumptions on the penalty function, this is the case. The proof proceeds
by first establishing appropriate consistency in the dual domain and then applying Theorem 3.2.
Proposition 3.6. Let U(x, t) be a utility random field and γt,T an admissible family of penalty
functions. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, for each T > 0, the primal value field
u(·; t, T ) is self-generating i.e.
u(x; s, T ) = ess sup
pi∈Abd
ess inf
Qs,t
{
EQ
[
u
(
x+
∫ t
s
πudSu; t, T
)∣∣∣∣Fs
]
+ γs,t(Q)
}
, 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T. (12)
For the case of standard (non–robust) utility maximization and deterministic utility functions it is
well-known that the value process satisfies the DPP; also referred to as the martingale optimality
principle, see [23]. In consequence, standard forward criteria may be seen as a generalization, to
all times t ≥ 0, of value functions associated with stochastic utility functions. Proposition 3.6
shows that a similar consistency property holds for certain ambiguity averse criteria; this has also
been used to address ambiguity averse problems by stochastic control arguments in, among others,
[40, 41, 61]. This further justifies our definition of robust forward criteria.
We recall that the value field associated with a general penalty function may not be dynamically
consistent (see [71] for counter-examples). Hence, while standard forward criteria might be viewed
as direct extensions of value functions associated with stochastic utility functions, Definition 2.3
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enforces a additional structure by imposing the dynamic consistency requirement (3) on the couple
(U, γ). Note that, in general, this is weaker than the assumption of dynamic consistency of γ.
Indeed, in Section 4.2 below, we construct an example of a dynamically consistent pair (U, γ) where
the penalty function itself is not. The robust forward criteria may then lead to time inconsistent
optimal investment strategies. In contrast, when the penalty functions are consistent, we recover
the time-consistency of the optimisers.
Proposition 3.7. Let U(x, t) and γt,T be a robust forward criterion such that Assumptions 1 and
2 hold. Assume further that for each 0 ≤ t < T < ∞ and ξ ∈ L∞(Ft) there is a saddle point
(πt,T (ξ),Qt,T (ξ)) for which u(ξ, t;T ) is attained (cf. (2)). Then, the saddle point may be taken to
be time consistent in that Qt,T (ξ) = Qt,T¯ (ξ)|FT , and
πt,Tu (ξ) = π
t,T¯
u (ξ) and π
t,T
u (ξ) = π
u,T
u
(
ξ +
∫ u
t
πsdSs
)
, 0 ≤ t ≤ u ≤ T ≤ T¯ .
Further, for x > 0, there exists a process π¯t, t ≥ 0, and a positive martingale Yt, t ≥ 0, such that,
for all 0 ≤ t < T <∞, u(x+
∫ t
0 π¯sdSs; t, T ) is attained for π
t,T = π¯s11s∈[t,T ) and Q¯, with
dQ¯
dP = YT .
The above result, combined with example in Section 4.2 shows that the dynamic consistency of
penalty functions (10) is a necessary and sufficient condition for time-consistency of optimal invest-
ment strategies. Further, it is clear from the example that this applies both to the robust forward
criteria studied here as well as the classical robust expected utility maximisation on a fixed horizon.
This leads to interesting open questions. First, of the economic justification for (10) which remains
unclear, see Remark 3.5 in [71]. Second, of generalisations of the optimisation problem in (2) which
would preserve time-consistency of optimal strategies while (10) is violated. The expression in
(2) arises from the representation of concave utility functionals in [32, 35] and its generalisations
correspond to quasi-concave functional explored in [11, 20]. Their use in the context of utility max-
imisation is investigated in a parallel work of Ka¨llblad [48]. The implications for time-consistency
and its link to (10) remain however open.
Finally, we show that the dynamic consistency property of penalty functions leads to a character-
ization of robust forward criteria in terms of a certain “weighted submartingale” property of the
dual field. This will be used to derive an equation allowing us to investigate particular classes of,
and to find examples of, the robust forward criteria (U, γ).
Proposition 3.8. Let U(x, t) be a utility random field and γt,T an admissible family of penalty
functions such that Assumption 1 holds. In addition, assume either that Assumption 2 holds, or
that (10) holds and, for all T > 0, U(x, T ) ∈ L1(FT ,Q) for all Q ∈ Q˜0,T . Let V (y, t) the dual field
given in (5). Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
i) U(x, t) and γt,T constitute a robust forward criterion;
ii) For each y > 0 and all t ≤ T <∞, it holds for all Q ∈ Qt,T and Z ∈ ZaT that
V (yZt/Z
Q
t , t) ≤ E
Q
[
V (yZT /Z
Q
T , T )
∣∣∣Ft]+ γt,T (Q). (13)
Further, there is Z ∈ Za and a positive martingale Yt, t ≥ 0, such that, for all t ≤ T < ∞,
QT ∈ Q0,T , with
dQT
dP = YT , and (13) holds as equality for ZT and QT .
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3.4 Penalty functions associated with risk measures
Recall that preferences specification akin to (2) is motivated by results in economics. The axiomatic
approach to ambiguity averse choices under uncertainty led to numerical representation in terms
of concave utility functionals, with the penalty function appearing naturally from the robust repre-
sentation of convex risk measures; see [36, 57] and [33] for an overview. We summarize now some
facts about such penalty functions and relate them to our assumptions. To this end, let ρt,T be a
conditional convex risk measure and γt,T its associated minimal penalty function (which we assume
to be bounded from below), given by
γt,T (Q) := ess sup
X∈L∞(FT )
(
EQ[−X |Ft]− ρt,T (X)
)
, (14)
for Q≪ P|FT . Then, it holds that
ρt,T (X) = ess sup
Q≪P|FT :
Q|Ft=P|Ft
(
EQ[−X |Ft]− γt,T (Q)
)
, (15)
for X ∈ L∞(FT ) (see, for example, [8, 19]). Within the context of ambiguity averse portfolio
optimization, it is common to restrict to risk measures ρt,T which are continuous from below, i.e.
for Y n ∈ L∞ such that Yn ր Y a.s. with Y ∈ L∞, ρt,T (Yn) → ρt,T (Y ) a.s., and, moreover,
“sensitive“, in that P (E[ρt,T (−εA)] > 0) > 0, for all ε > 0 and A ∈ FT such that P(A) > 0. These
properties render, respectively, the associated level sets {Q ≪ P : γ0,T (Q) < c}, c > 0, weakly
compact and Qe non-empty (cf. Lemma 4.1 in [71] and Remark 3.5 above).
We note that X ∈ L∞ in (14) and (15), while U(XpiT , T ) only lies in L
1. This, however, is not an
issue and, in particular, we do not have to restrict γ in line with extensions of the risk measure
theory to Lp-spaces, p = [1,∞), (see [30, 46] and, for the conditional case, [1, 29]). Indeed, in
analogy with [71], it suffices to impose (weaker) joint integrability conditions on U(x, t) and γ to
ensure that the value function u(·; t, T ) is well-defined (cf. Definition 2.2).
A penalty function γt,T in (14) associated with a risk measure satisfies properties i) - iii) of Definition
2.2. However, in general, it will not satisfy the weak compactness assumptions used above (cf.
Assumption 1). To illustrate this, note that for this type of penalty functions, it is natural to
restrict the set Qt,T in (1) to its subset (cf. e.g. Theorem 1.4 in [2]):{
Q ∼ P|FT : E
Q
[
γt,T (Q)
]
<∞
}
. (16)
For a general convex risk measure, this set is not weakly compact. However, as we consider risk
measures which are continuous from below, the associated level sets are. In particular, for a coherent
risk measure, which corresponds to γ ∈ {0,∞}, it follows that
Qat,T :=
{
Q≪ P|FT : Q = P on Ft and γt,T (Q) = 0, a.s.
}
is weakly compact. If further Qat,T ⊆ {Q ∼ P|FT }, then the set in (16) is also weakly compact.
An example of such a risk measure is considered in [40] (cf. also Theorem 3.16 in [52]). Naturally,
Assumption 1 allows for much more flexibility.
14
For convex risk measures, time-consistency is characterized by property (10). Indeed, (10) is equiv-
alent (cf. e.g. Theorem 4.5 in [31]) to ρ, given in (15), satisfying, for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T ,
ρs,T (X) = ρs,t(−ρt,T (X)). (17)
One would expect this property, combined with Assumption 1, to be sufficient for Lemmas 5.6 and
5.7 to hold. Indeed, assume that U(x, T ) ∈ L∞, for x ∈ R. For a fixed strategy π¯ ∈ Abd, the
relation in (12) then reduces to
φs,T
(
U
(
X p¯iT , T
))
= φs,t
(
φt,T
(
U
(
X p¯iT , T
))
, (18)
where φ(X) = −ρ(X). Note that (18) holds true due to (17). Time-consistency of the value
function has also been verified for the choice of specific models and utility functions (see, among
others, [40]). We leave proving our results under this assumption for future research and restrict
ourselves to the stronger Assumption 2. Note that any time-consistent coherent risk measure admits
the pasting property (11) (cf. Corollary 1.26 in [2]). In fact, in our case when all measures in Qt,T
are equivalent to the reference measure, even more explicit results hold for these risk measures (for
results on the relation between stable sets and time-consistent coherent risk measures, we refer to
[17, 31, 52]).
4 On structure, specific classes and examples of robust for-
ward criteria
Within a Brownian filtration, we consider a logarithmic robust forward criterion with a quadratic
penalty structure (cf. Proposition 4.1). The example is of particular interest as it gives theoretical
justification to fractional Kelly strategies often used in practice by large investment funds. More
precisely, the investor estimates (dynamically) the market growth (Kelly) strategy Xˆ and invests
a (dynamically adjusted) fraction of her wealth in Xˆ. The leverage, in our framework, has the
interpretation of investor’s confidence in his estimate of Xˆ.
The example belongs to a certain class of so-called non–volatile robust forward criteria. We elab-
orate further on this in Section 4.3. Specifically, we provide a formal discussion illustrating the
structure of forward criteria and the fact that additional assumptions are needed in order to pin
down a unique criterion from a given initial condition and penalty structure. Specific attention is
paid to the non–volatile criteria, which are characterized by a specific evolutionary property and
linked to a certain PDE (cf. equation (34) below).
Despite its specific form, the example in Section 4.1 illustrates yet a crucial fact about robust
forward criteria. Namely, that for each robust forward criterion, there exists a (standard) forward
criterion in the fixed reference market, giving rise to the same optimal behaviour. This is further
discussed in Section 4.4.
4.1 Non-volatile criteria yielding fractional Kelly strategies
We first specify the Brownian setup considered throughout this section. At this point, we stress
that in reality the investor does not have access to the “true model”, which is an abstract concept.
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Instead, the investor decides on a reference model Pˆ. In the example below this will be a dynamically
updated estimate for the most likely description of reality. It is therefore natural to expect γt,T (·)(ω)
to have a global minimum at Pˆ|FT . Further, in the example considered below, we will also see that
the randomness of U(·, x, t) is expressed through the realisation of Pˆ|Ft , t ≥ 0.
For simplicity, let d = 1 in that the market only consists of one risky asset. Recall that S0t ≡ 1. We
consider a filtration generated by a two-dimensional Pˆ-Brownian motion Wt = (Wˆ
1
t , Wˆ
2
t ), t ≥ 0,
and assume that S1t solves
dS1t = S
1
t
(
λˆtdt+ σtdWˆ
1
t
)
, (19)
for some F-progressively measurable processes σt, σt 6= 0 a.s., and λˆt, t ≥ 0. The latter is referred
to as the investor’s estimated market price of risk. Further, in this section, we let (πt)t≥0, denote
the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset. The associated wealth process then follows the
dynamics
dXpit = πtX
pi
t σt
(
λˆtdt+ dWˆ
1
t
)
, X0 = x.
The set of admissible strategies is defined as follows:
A :=
{
π : (πt) adapted, (X
pi
t ) well-defined and X
pi
t > 0 a.s. for all t > 0
}
,
and we also write Ax when we want to stress the initial wealth X0 = x. Finally, we denote by Axt
the analogue set of strategies on [t,∞) starting from Xpit = x.
Given the Brownian filtration, any measure Q ∼ Pˆ on FT admits a process ηt = (η
1
t , η
2
t ) ∈ P × P ,
t ≤ T , such that dQ
dPˆ
∣∣
FT
= DηT , where the process
Dηt := E
(∫
η1sdWˆ
1
s +
∫
η2sdWˆ
2
s
)
t
, (20)
is a martingale on [0, T ]. We write Q = Qη and, for the present example, assign it a penalty given
by
γt,T (Q
η) :=

 E
Qη
[ ∫ T
t
δu
2 |ηu|
2
du
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
if EQ
η
[ ∫ T
t λˆ
2
sds
]
<∞
+∞ otherwise,
(21)
for some adapted, non–negative process (δt) which controls the strength of the penalisation (cf.
also (29) below). The investor is aware that Pˆ may be an inaccurate estimate of the market and
(δt) quantifies her trust in Pˆ. Note that γt,T may fail to satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. In particular,
Qt,T in (1) may not be weakly compact. This is not a problem since, for this example, we present
a direct proof. Finally, we assume that there exists κ > 1/2 such that Eˆ
[
exp
(
κ
∫ T
0
λˆ2sds
)]
< ∞
for all T > 0. This is a convenient integrability assumption which can be interpreted as Pˆ being
reasonable. Note that it implies in particular, by Novikov’s condition, that (Zνt ) in (30) with ν ≡ 0
is a Pˆ-martingale.
Proposition 4.1. Given the investor’s choice of (λˆt) and (δt) as above, let
η¯t :=
[
− λˆt/(1 + δt), 0
]
and π¯t :=
δt
1 + δt
λˆt
σt
, (22)
16
and
U(x, t) := lnx−
1
2
∫ t
0
δs
1 + δs
λˆ2sds, t ≥ 0, x ∈ R+. (23)
Recall that the penalty γ is given by (21) and assume that γ0,T (η¯) < ∞ for T > 0. Then, for all
0 ≤ t ≤ T <∞,
U(x, t) = ess sup
pi∈Axt
ess inf
η∈Qt,T
Eη
[
U(XpiT , T ) + γt,T (Q
η)
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, (24)
and the optimum is attained for the saddle point (η¯, π¯) as given in (22).
The above result implies that the utility random field U(x, t), given in (23), and the penalty function
γt,T in (21) constitute a robust forward criterion. For comparison, recall (cf. [63]) that the random
field
U(x, t) = lnx−
1
2
∫ t
0
λˆ2sds, t ≥ 0, x ∈ R+, (25)
constitutes a standard (non-volatile) forward criterion in the reference market Pˆ with market price
of risk λˆt, t ≥ 0. We will see below that the above dynamics may be deduced by analysing the dual
field, see (32) or (34). However, the proof below is carried out directly in the primal domain.
Proof. Fix 0 ≤ t ≤ T < ∞. To alleviate the notation, let Lt =
∫ t
0
λˆudWˆu. We have, with
1/p+ 1/q = 1 and 1/p˜+ 1/q˜ = 1,
EQ
η¯
[ ∫ T
0
λˆ2sds
]
= Eˆ
[
Dη¯T
∫ T
0
λˆ2sds
]
= Eˆ
[
Dη¯T 〈L〉Tds
]
≤
(
Eˆ[(Dη¯T )
p]
)1/p (
Eˆ[〈L〉qT ]
)1/q
≤
(
Eˆ
[
epp˜LT−
p2p˜2
2
〈L〉T
]) 1
pp˜ (
Eˆ
[
eκ〈L〉T
]) 1
pq˜
(
Eˆ[〈L〉qT ]
)1/q
<∞,
where we took p˜ < 2κ and p > 1 such that q˜
(
p2p˜
2 −
p
2
)
= pp˜(pp˜−1)2(p˜−1) = κ. It follows that γt,T (Q
η¯) <
∞. Let
Npi,ηu := U(X
pi
u , u) +
∫ u
t
δs
2
|ηs|
2ds, u ≥ t.
Then, it suffices to show that Eη¯
[
Npi,η¯T |Ft
]
≤ Npi,η¯t , for all π ∈ A
x
t , and that E
η
[
N p¯i,ηT |Ft
]
≥ N p¯i,ηt ,
for all η ∈ Qt,T . For simplicity, and w.l.o.g., we show the claim in the case t = 0. For π ∈ Ax, the
wealth process satisfies
dXpit = πtX
pi
t σt
[(
λˆt + η
1
t
)
dt+ dW ηt
]
, t ≤ T, Xpi0 = x,
where W ηt is a Brownian motion under Q
η. Due to the form of U(x, t) and π¯, a straight-forward
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application of Itoˆ’s Lemma yields
dN p¯i,ηt =
δt
1 + δt
λˆt
[(
λˆt + η
1
t
)
dt+ dW ηt
]
−
1
2
(
δt
1 + δt
λˆt
)2
dt
−
1
2
δt
1 + δt
λˆ2tdt+
δt
2
[(
η1t
)2
+
(
η2t
)2]
dt
=
δt
1 + δt
λˆtη
1
t dt+
1
2
δt
(1 + δt)2
λˆ2tdt+
δt
1 + δt
λˆtdW
η
t +
δt
2
[(
η1t
)2
+
(
η2t
)2]
dt
=
δt
2


(
λˆt + (1 + δt) η
1
t
1 + δt
)2
+
(
η2t
)2 dt+ δt
1 + δt
λˆtdW
η
t .
Note that the quantity δt/(1 + δt) ∈ (0, 1), so by the definition of γt,T in (21), the process∫ t
0
δs
1+δs
λˆsdW
η
s is a martingale under Q
η. It follows that N p¯i,ηt is a submartingale for all η ∈ Q0,T
and a martingale for η¯ as specified in (22). On the other hand, it holds that
U(XpiT , T ) +
∫ T
0
gs(η¯s)ds = lnX
pi
T −
∫ T
0
1
2
δs
1 + δs
λˆ2s −
1
2
δs
(1 + δs)2
λˆ2sds
= lnXpiT −
1
2
∫ T
0
[
δs
1 + δs
λˆs
]2
ds = lnXpiT −
1
2
∫ T
0
(
λˆs + η¯
1
s
)2
ds.
Since Eη¯
[
lnXpiT
]
≤ Eη¯
[
lnX p¯iT
]
for any strategy π ∈ Ax, we conclude that
Eη¯
[
Npi,η¯T
]
≤ Eη¯
[
lnX p¯iT
]
− Eη¯
[
1
2
∫ T
0
(
λˆs + η¯
1
s
)2
ds
]
= ln x = N0,
where the equality follows by a direct computation (see, also, p. 721 in [49]).
The investor’s optimal behaviour described in Proposition 4.1 corresponds to strategies used in
practice by some of the large fund managers. Specifically, the strategy, characterised by the optimal
fraction of wealth to be invested in the risky asset in (22), is a fractional Kelly strategy. The investor
invests in the growth optimal (Kelly) portfolio corresponding to her best estimate of the market
price of risk λˆ. However she is not fully invested but instead chooses a leverage proportional to her
trust in the estimate λˆ. If δt ր∞ (infinite trust in the estimation), then π¯t ր λˆt/σt which is the
Kelly strategy associated with the most likely model Pˆ. On the other hand, if δt ց 0 (no trust in
the estimation), then π¯t ց 0 and the optimal behaviour is to invest nothing.
We stress that λˆ and δ are the investor’s arbitrary inputs. They might be data driven and come
from an elaborate dynamic estimation procedure, be expert driven or simply come from a black
box. In particular, there is no assumption that λˆ is a good estimate of the true market price of risk
λ. In fact the latter never appears in the problem. It is crucial that the investor’s utility function
(23) evolves in function of the investor’s perception of market leading to a time-consistent behaviour
solving (24). This seem to capture well the investment practice – in reality an investor never knows
the “true” model. Instead, she is likely to build (and keep updating) her best estimate thereof and
act on it. This, as shown in Proposition 4.1, can still lead to time-consistent optimal investment
strategy. In practice, the leverage has often a risk interpretation, e.g. it is adjusted to achieve a
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targeted level of volatility for the fund. In our framework, it is interpreted in terms of confidence
δ in the estimate λˆ. In practice, the leverage is adjusted rarely in comparison to the dynamic
updating of the estimate λˆ. Similarly, in our framework, the trust in one’s estimation methods is
likely to be adjusted on a much slower scale than the changes to the estimate itself.
We note that the structure of the optimal investment strategy relies on the logarithmic form of the
utility field (23). Hence, on a finite time interval, one may expect a similar type of behaviour to
be optimal also for some classical ambiguity averse utility maximization problem with logarithmic
utility. The robust forward criterion in Proposition 4.1 presents, however, in many aspects the
simplest way of quantifying preferences corresponding to the investment behaviour in (22). For ex-
ample, these preferences are non-volatile while the value field associated with a deterministic utility
function at a fixed horizon T , would be volatile4. As further discussed in Section 4.3, robust forward
criteria provides an alternative tool for the study of the link between investment strategies and the
dynamic behaviour of the associated preferences. Proposition 4.1 illustrates this by providing, for
a very popular investment strategy, the specification of compatible preferences with a particularly
simple dynamic structure.
Remark 4.2. For δt ≡ δ, the penalty function defined in (21) corresponds to the entropic penalty
function γ(Q) = δH(Q|Pˆ). For each fixed horizon T , the investment problem can then be rewritten
as (cf. Remark 4.1 in [33]),
u(x, 0) = sup
pi
inf
Q
(
EQ [U(XpiT , T )] + δH(Q|Pˆ)
)
= sup
pi
−δ ln EPˆ
[
e−
1
δ
U(XpiT ,T )
]
.
Consequently, the problem is equivalent to a standard utility maximization problem with respect to
the modified utility function U˜(x, T ) = −e−
1
δ
U(x,T ) in the market Pˆ. Therefore, it is then more
natural to consider utility from intertemporal consumption (cf. [10, 13, 28, 43, 56, 76]). Note,
however, that δt, t ≥ 0, is non-constant in our setting and, thus, the situation is different.
4.2 Criteria leading to time-inconsistent optimal investment strategies
We turn now to an example of robust forward criteria which lead to time inconsistent optimal
investment strategies. This complements our discussion in Sections 2.2 and 3.3. Lack of time-
consistency of optimal strategies will be inherited from lack of dynamic-consistency of penalty
functions. Here, for illustrative purposes, we develop an example where (10) is violated in a rather
unrealistically simplistic way.
We work in the setting of Section 4.1. We set λˆ ≡ 0 and we fix a family of bounded random
variables (λt,T ) with 0 ≤ t ≤ T , T ≥ 0, each λt,T being Ft–measurable. Then we put
γt,T (Q
η) :=
{
−T−t2 (λ
t,T )2 if (η1u, η
2
u) = (λ
t,T , 0), t ≤ u ≤ T,
+∞ otherwise.
(26)
4For a comparison with the variational criterion featuring (deterministic) logarithmic utility at some fixed horizon
T > 0, we refer to [41] for a stochastic factor model and Theorem 4.5 in [55] for the non-Markovian case.
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Clearly this is a degenerate and artificial example. At any time t, looking to invest on [t, T ], the
investor believes only one model is feasible and gives it a well chosen negative penalty. The choice
of this model changes arbitrary with t and T and there is no consistency requirement. Consider
the extreme situation when all λt,T are constant and T fixed. Then, at time zero, the investor
picks possibly different models which she will chose to believe when making investment decisions
at t for horizon [t, T ]. It it is not surprising that this may lead to time-inconsistent investment
strategies. However the flexibility of fixing the penalty γt,T means that the dynamic-consistency of
value functions, (4) on [0, T ] or (3) in general, may be preserved.
We let U(x, t) := lnx and ηt,Tu := 0 for u < t and η
t,T
u := (λ
t,T , 0) for t ≤ u ≤ T . Note that by
definition Qt,T = {Qη
t,T
} so, using the classical results on log utility maximisation, we have
u(ξ, t, T ) = ln ξ +
1
2
EQ
ηt,T
[∫ t
0
|ηt,Tu |
2du
∣∣∣Ft
]
+ γt,T (Q
ηt,T )
= ln ξ +
1
2
(T − t)(λt,T )2 + γt,T (Q
ηt,T ) = ln ξ = U(ξ, t), t ≤ T,
and we conclude that (U, γ) is a robust forward criteria and the value function is dynamically-
consistent. Meanwhile, the resulting optimal strategy, at time t when investing for the horizon
[t, T ] is π¯t,Tu =
λt,T
σt
, t ≤ u ≤ T . Even when considering classical (robust) portfolio optimisation on
[0, T ] these may be time inconsistent in the sense that π¯t,Tu 6= π¯
u,T
u for t ≤ u ≤ T . In our context of
forward criteria, when T is not fixed, the “optimal strategy” may be further horizon-inconsistent
in the sense that we may have π¯t,Tt 6= π¯
t,T1
t for t ≤ T < T1. Hence, the “optimal strategy” is not
really a well defined concept since it may depend not only on when we make the decision but also
on which horizon we want to consider. This is due to fundamental inconsistencies in the beliefs
about feasible market models and violation of (10). The latter is in fact a non-trivial requirement.
For example, penalty functions associated to convex risk measures via (14) do not satisfy (10) in
general. Whether (10) is justified economically and empirically is one of interesting open questions
resulting from our work, see also Remark 3.5 in Schied [71].
4.3 On some important classes of robust forward criteria
We discuss now the structure of robust forward criteria. Within the setup of Section 4.1, we describe
the issue of non-uniqueness of robust forward criteria for given initial preferences. Examples of
choices of specific classes of criteria where the uniqueness may be recovered are provided. Particular
attention is paid to the class of so called non-volatile criteria, to which the main example studied
in Section 4.1 belongs. Here, we present a formal discussion motivating the definition of this class
and illustrating its main features.
4.3.1 The structure of robust forward criteria
In the model-specific (non–robust) case, the robust forward performances are not uniquely specified
from the initial condition. This is due to the flexibility of the volatility structure. Before turning to
the robust case, we recall the features of this structure. It holds that a random field is a (standard)
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forward criterion if, for all times t ≥ 0, it satisfies the SPDE
dU(x, t) =
1
2
∣∣λtUx(x, t) + σtσ+t ax(x, t)∣∣2
Uxx(x, t)
dt+ a(x, t)dWt, (27)
equipped with the initial condition U(x, 0) = u0(x). Similarly, the value function corresponding to
the classical utility maximization problem satisfies (under some regularity conditions) the Backward
SPDE (27) equipped with the terminal condition U(x, T ) = U(x). We refer, respectively, to [64]
and [58] for a detailed presentation of these equations. A solution to the BSPDE (27) equipped
with a terminal condition is a pair of parameter-dependent processes U(x, t) and a(x, t) which
are simultaneously obtained when solving the equation. Under some regularity conditions, the
solution is unique (cf. [58]). However, the presence of the volatility a(x, t) implies that there
might exist multiple stochastic terminal conditions, for all of which the associated solution satisfies
U(x, 0) = u0(x). Put differently, starting from u0(x) = U(x, 0) and solving forward in time we
might arrive at different U(x, T ) depending on the choice of a(x, t). It follows that the forward
SPDE (27) might have multiple solutions which are catalogued by their volatility a(x, t). We refer
to Section 1 in [65] for further discussion and axiomatic motivation. Likewise, even with a fixed
penalty function, in order to specify robust forward criteria uniquely, we expect the need to impose
further constraints. These could be either on the form of the primal/dual field or on the choice of
volatility structure. We discuss both below.
4.3.2 Imposing constraints on the dual field
We start with a formal discussion of a logarithmic example. Namely, we assume that V (y, t) admits
the representation
V (y, t) = − ln y +
∫ t
0
bsds+
∫ t
0
as · dWˆs, (28)
for some processes bt and at which are independent of y. Further, we assign to the measure Q
η (cf.
(20)) a penalty given by5
γt,T (Q) := E
Q
[∫ T
t
gu(ηu)du
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, (29)
for some function g : [0,∞) × R2 → [0,∞), such that gt(·) is convex, lower semicontinuous and
satisfies the so called coercivity condition that gt(η) ≥ −a + b|η|2 for some constants a and b (cf.
(8.6) in [33]). For example, the choice of gt(η) = |η|2 +∞1{|η|>g} for some constant g > 0, ensures
that γt,T satisfies both Assumptions 1 and 2.
6 We let Q = ∩T>0Q0,T .
Let P denote the set of all F-progressively measurable processes (νt)t≥0 such that
∫ T
0 ν
2
t dt <∞ a.s.
for all T > 0. We assume that (λˆt) is in P . For ν ∈ P , let
Zνt := E
(
−
∫
λˆsdWˆ
1
s −
∫
νsdWˆ
2
s
)
t
. (30)
5We recall that according to [16], it holds within a Brownian filtration that a dynamic penalty function is time-
consistent (cf. (10)) if and only if it is representable as in (29) for some gt(·).
6This follows e.g. from Lemma 3.1 in [40] and the fact that Qt,T is weakly compact if and only if it is closed in
L0, see also discussion below Assumption 1 above.
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We note that Ze = {Zν : ν ∈ P and Zνt is a Pˆ-martingale on [0,∞)} and write ν ∈ Z
e for Zν ∈ Ze.
In particular, the assumption of NFLVR on finite horizons implies that νt ≡ 0 ∈ Ze. According to
Lemma 5.7, in order for V (y, t) and γt,T to be self-generating, it then suffices
7 that for all ν ∈ Ze
and η ∈ Q, the process
Mηνt := V
(
yZνt /D
η
t , t
)
+
∫ t
0
g(ηs)ds (31)
is a Qη-sub-martingale, and there exist ν∗ and η∗ for which it is a martingale. We recall that Qη is
given by dQ
η
dP |Ft = D
η
t , with D
η
t specified in (20). A straight-forward application of Itoˆ-Ventzell’s
formula, using that Vyy(y, t) = 1/y
2, and formal minimization over νt, yields that in order for M
ην
t
to satisfy this, the following relation must hold between at and bt:
bt = − inf
η
{
g(η) +
(
η1 + λˆt
)2
2
+ at · η
}
, a.s., t ≥ 0. (32)
We see that a given initial condition, a fixed penalty function g(·) and a volatility structure at
typically lead to a unique robust forward criteria: the drift is then specified via (32). In consequence,
for a given initial condition and specific penalty structure, a unique criterion may only be pinned
down based on further specification of the dynamic properties of U(x, t).
To conclude let us comment on another type of restriction on V . In many situations we might
only be interested in solutions which are Markovian. For example, within a (Markovian) stochastic
factor model, we could require that the utility field is a deterministic function of the underlying
factors. This function must then solve a specific equation, closely related to the HJB equation
associated with the classical value function within the same factor model. However, in the forward
setting, the equation has to be solved forwards in time and is thus ill-posed. We refer to [65] for a
study of such criteria in a model-specific setup.
4.3.3 Imposing constraints on the volatility structure
We consider now constraints expressed in terms of the volatility structure. More specifically, we
consider the class of criteria for which the volatility of the dual field (cf. (27) and (28)) is identically
zero; we refer to this class as non–volatile criteria. Specifically, we assume that
dV (y, t) = Vt(y, t)dt. (33)
For standard forward criteria, this additional assumption specifies an interesting class of preferences;
see [7, 63]. In particular, we refer to [7] for a detailed discussion of the assumption (33). Similarly
to the example in Section 4.3.2, a straight-forward application of Itoˆ-Ventzell’s formula and formal
minimization over νt, yields that in order for M
ην
t (cf. (31)) to be a sub-martingale for each
choice of ν and η and a martingale at optimum, the random convex function V (y, t) must solve the
equation
Vt(y, t) + inf
η
{
g(η) +
y2Vyy(y, t)
2
(
η1t + λˆt
)2 }
= 0, a.s., t ≥ 0. (34)
7The stronger assumptions on γt,T in Lemma 5.7 are used only to argue the necessity.
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This is a random equation, satisfied pathwise by the parameter-dependent process V (y, t). The
simplification from SPDE to a random PDE results from the restriction to non–volatile criteria. In
particular, and in contrast to the SPDE case discussed above, we would expect that under suitable
regularity assumptions (34) admits a unique solutions.
Equation (34) might be viewed as a (dual) Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. In particular, a
verification theorem stating that every well-behaved (convex) solution to (34) constitutes a robust
forward criterion might be proven. However, to prove existence or explicitly solve this equation is
hard. In order to illustrate this, consider the case of no model-uncertainty, which corresponds to
g(η) =∞, η 6= 0. Then, equation (34) reduces to
Vt(y, t) +
λˆ2t
2
y2Vyy(y, t) = 0 a.s., t ≥ 0. (35)
This equation characterizes standard non-volatile criteria in a model with market price of risk
(λˆt). Equation (35), see [7, 63], is closely related to the (ill-posed) backward heat equation whose
solutions only exist for a specific class of initial conditions, as characterised by Widder’s theorem.
Equation (34) inherits difficulties related to the equation being ill–posed but in addition is highly
non-linear. Further, we have to ensure that its solution is adapted.
Note that in our main example, studied in Section 4.1 above, the criterion (23) is logarithmic as
well as non-volatile, and the appropriate form of the drift-term could, formally, be obtained by
substituting the dual Ansatz V (y, t) = − ln y+
∫ t
0
bsds into either of equations (32) or (34). This is
a rare case of an interesting and explicit solution to these equations. We leave the analysis of (34)
as a challenging problem open for further research.
4.4 Equivalent standard (non-robust) forward criteria
We conclude with some remarks on the existence of equivalent forward criteria within a non–robust
setting. To this end, observe that the optimal strategy π¯ in (22) can also be interpreted as the
Kelly-strategy associated with an auxiliary market with market price of risk λ¯t given by
λ¯t := λˆt + η¯
1
t =
δt
1 + δt
λˆt. (36)
That is, the market price of risk λˆ that the investor thinks most likely, adjusted by the investor’s
trust in that estimation. This is closely related to the fact that the existence of the saddle-point
(π¯, η¯) implies that the optimal investment associated with the robust criterion (21) and (23) coin-
cides with the optimal investment corresponding to the non-volatile standard forward criterion (cf.
(25)),
U(x, t) = lnx−
1
2
∫ t
0
λ¯2sds, t ≥ 0, x ∈ R+, (37)
specified in the market with the market-price of risk λ¯. This is clear from the proof of Proposition
4.1. Such an equivalence can be established in far more generality. Indeed, given the existence of
a saddle-point, the robust forward criterion, consisting of the pair U(x, t) in (23) and γt,T in (29),
ranks investment strategies in the same way as does the standard forward criterion,
U˜(x, t) := U(x, t) +
∫ t
0
gs(η¯s)ds, (38)
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considered in the auxiliary market with the market price of risk (λ¯t) with λ¯t = λˆt + η¯
1
t . Further,
a formal application of Bayes’ rule implies that the optimal strategy associated with the criterion
(38), is also optimal for the following forward criterion specified in the reference market:
Dη¯t U˜(x, t) = D
η¯
t
(
U(x, t) +
∫ t
0
gs(η¯s)ds
)
. (39)
Note that if U(x, t) is a non-volatile criterion, Dη¯t U˜(x, t) is in general volatile (cf. Theorem 4 in
[62] for examples). Indeed, the assumption of non-volatility is market specific. Here (cf. (33)), the
non-volatility requirement is placed on the random field associated with the robust criterion. If a
saddle-point exists, the criterion is therefore non-volatile in the market specified by the optimal
measure while the corresponding criterion in the reference market is volatile.
For the class of robust forward criteria for which the above formalism can be made rigorous, the
following holds: if the robust forward criterion admits an optimal strategy, then that strategy is
optimal also for a specific standard (non-robust) forward criterion viewed in the reference market.
Naturally, the latter criterion is defined in terms of the optimal η¯t, which is part of the solution
to the robust problem and not a priori known. Nevertheless, on a more abstract level, this implies
that viewed as a class of preference criteria, forward criteria can be argued to be ’closed’ under the
introduction of a certain type of model uncertainty. For a similar conclusion in terms of the use of
different numeraires, see Theorem 2.5 in [25] or Section 5.1 in [24]. This should also be compared
to [76], where it was shown that to invest with respect to a given stochastic differential utility
combined with a certain model uncertainty is equivalent to considering a modified stochastic dif-
ferential utility within the reference model (therein, entropic penalty functions were considered but
for a Brownian filtration and under some additional boundedness assumptions, the results can be
extended also to variational preferences). For stochastic differential utilities as well as for forward
criteria, the underlying reason is that the notion is general enough to allow for stochastic prefer-
ences. In particular, use of deterministic utility functions under model uncertainty is (under various
conditions) equivalent to the use of specific stochastic utility functions for a fixed model.
The above implies that the preferences corresponding to (most) robust forward criteria may be
embedded within the (standard) class of forward criteria. Nevertheless, we believe the example
studied in this section illustrates that the notion of robust forward criteria is of interest. The aim
of these criteria and the associated specific modelling of model uncertainty, is to disentangle the
impact of the preferences originating from risk and model-ambiguity, respectively. A related and
more involved question is under what conditions a given (volatile non-robust) forward criterion
can be written as a non-volatile robust forward criterion with respect to some non-trivial penalty
function. This question is left for future research. We also remark that the analysis herein and, thus,
the above discussion, is restricted to measures equivalent to P. Considering absolutely continuous
measures introduces further complexity (cf. [71] for the static case) but should not alter the main
conclusions. In contrast, considering a larger set of possibly mutually singular measures would
require new insights, see [18, 67].
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5 Proofs
5.1 Proof of Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 3.3
As discussed in Section 3.2, the proof of Theorem 3.2 makes us of arguments and results presented
in [71] and [79], respectively. To this end, we follows the notation in [79] closely. In Section 5.1.2,
we prove conjugacy relations and existence of an optimizer for an auxiliary F0-measurable problem
which we introduce below. In Section 5.1.3, Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 3.3 are proven by reducing
the general problem to the auxiliary one.
5.1.1 Notation
We let 0 ≤ t ≤ T < ∞ with t and T arbitrary, and κ a random variable in L∞+ (Ft). We will
typically consider κ = 11A, A ∈ Ft, and use it to localise arguments to a set. We will also use
the notation Zt,T ∈ ZaT to denote an element of the set {Zt,T |Z ∈ Z
a
T }, and Z ∈ Qt,T to denote
an element of the set {ZQ|Q ∈ Qt,T }. Unless stated otherwise, all the Lp-spaces, p ∈ [0,∞], are
defined with respect to (Ω,FT ,P|FT ).
We also let Kt,T :=
{∫ T
t
πsdSs : π ∈ Abd
}
and Ct,T :=
(
Kt,T − L0+
)
∩ L∞. Note that the opti-
mization over Kt,T in (2), might be replaced by optimization over Ct,T . Then, for Q ∈ Qt,T , we
introduce the function
uQκ (ξ) = sup
g∈Ct,T
E
[
κZQt,TU(ξ + g, T )
]
, ξ ∈ L∞(Ft).
Next, let Dt,T :=
{
ζ∗ ∈ (L∞)∗ : 〈ζ∗, ζ〉 ≤ 0 for all ζ ∈ Ct,T
}
and, for η ∈ L1+(Ft), let D
η
t,T :=
{
ζ∗ ∈
Dt,T : 〈ζ∗, ξ〉 = 〈η, ξ〉, for all ξ ∈ L∞(Ft)
}
. According to Lemma A.4 in [79], we have that
ζ∗ ∈ Dt,T ∩ L
1
+ if and only if ζ
∗ = ηZt,T , (40)
for some η ∈ L1+(Ft) and Zt,T ∈ Z
a
T . Note that the proof of this result uses that the market satisfies
NFLVR on finite horizons. In turn, define the function VQκ : Dt,T → (−∞,∞] by
VQκ (ζ
∗) :=
{
E
[
κZQt,TV
(
ζ∗/
(
κZQt,T
)
, T
)]
, ζ∗ ∈ L1+ and {ζ
∗ > 0} ⊆ {κ > 0},
∞, otherwise;
(41)
and the function vQκ : L
1(Ft)→ (−∞,∞] by
vQκ (η) :=
{
infζ∗∈Dη
t,T
VQκ (ζ
∗), η ∈ L1+(Ft),
∞, η ∈ L1(Ft) \ L1+(Ft).
(42)
Finally, we define the auxiliary value functions uκ : L
∞(Ft)→ (−∞,∞] by
uκ(ξ) = sup
g∈Ct,T
inf
Q∈Qt,T
E
[
κ
(
ZQt,TU(ξ + g, T ) + γt,T (Q)
)]
,
and vκ : L
1(Ft)→ (−∞,∞] by
vκ(η) = inf
Q∈Qt,T
(
vQκ (η) + E [κγt,T (Q)]
)
.
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5.1.2 Results for the auxiliary value functions uκ and vκ
We establish results for the F0-measurable value functions uκ and vκ. Theorem 3.2 and Proposition
3.3 are then proven by reducing the problem to this case by taking expectations (cf. Section 5.1.3).
First, we consider the existence of a dual optimizer.
Proposition 5.1. Let η ∈ L1+(Ft). Then, there exists (ζ¯
∗, Q¯) ∈ Dηt,T ×Qt,T such that
vκ(η) = V
Q¯
κ (ζ¯
∗) + E
[
κγt,T (Q¯)
]
.
Moreover, the function vκ(η) is convex and lower semicontinuous with respect to the weak topology.
Proof. Since η ∈ L1+(Ft), we deduce that
vQκ (η) = inf
ζ∗∈Dη
t,T
VQκ (ζ
∗), Q ∈ Qt,T . (43)
Hence, let (ζ∗n,Qn) ∈ D
η
t,T ×Qt,T , a sequence such that
VQnκ (ζ
∗
n) + E
[
κγt,T (Qn)
]
→ vκ(η). (44)
Since Qt,T is weakly compact, there is a (sub) sequence (ζ∗n,Qn) (also denoted by n) such that
Qn converges a.s. to some Q¯ ∈ Qt,T . From the Banach-Alaouglu theorem, we have that Dt,T is
weak∗-compact. Hence, using the same argument as in the proof of Corollary A2 in [79], we deduce
that there is a further sub sequence (denoted by n) such that ζ∗n converges to some ζ¯
∗ ∈ Dηt,T in
the weak∗-topology.
Given Assumption 1, Proposition A.3 in [79] may be applied to the utility field U˜(x, t) = ZQt,TU(x, T ).
It then follows that
VQκ (ζ
∗) = sup
ζ∈L∞
(
E
[
κZQt,TU(ζ, T )
]
− 〈ζ∗, ζ〉
)
. (45)
Note that for each ζ ∈ L∞, {ZQt,TU
−(ζ, T ) : Q ∈ Qt,T } is uniformly integrable due to Assumption
1. Applying Fatou’s Lemma to the positive part then yields that the first term in (45) is lower
semicontinuous as a function of Q ∈ Qt,T with respect to a.s. convergence. The second term is
continuous in ζ∗ with respect to weak∗-convergence. Since the supremum preserves lower semicon-
tinuity, it follows that the mapping (ζ∗,Q) → VQκ (ζ
∗) is jointly l.s.c. with respect to the product
topology on Dηt,T ×Qt,T . Recall that by Definition 2.2, the mapping Q→ E [κγt,T (Q)] is l.s.c. with
respect to a.s. convergence. Combined with (44) applied to the subsequence defined above, this
yields the existence of a minimizer (ζ¯∗, Q¯).
The convexity of vκ(η) follows immediately from the joint convexity of the mapping (ζ
∗,Q) →
VQκ (ζ
∗) + E [κγt,T (Q)] (cf. (45)). To argue the lower semicontinuity, we work as follows. Let
ηα ∈ L1+ such that ηα → η weakly and let (ζ
∗
α,Qα) be such that vκ(ηα) ≥ V
Qα
κ (ζ
∗
α) +E [κγt,T (Qα)].
Using similar arguments as above, one can show that there exists a subsequence (ζ∗α,Qα) converging
in the product topology. Using the joint lower semicontinuity of the mapping (ζ∗,Q)→ VQκ (ζ
∗) +
E [κγt,T (Q)] yields the lower semicontinuity of vκ(η).
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Next, we establish the conjugacy relations for uκ and vκ (cf. Proposition 5.4 below). To this end,
we first establish two auxiliary lemmas. The first one follows by applying Propositions A1 and A3
in [79] to the auxiliary stochastic utility function U˜(x, T ) given in (7).
Lemma 5.2. Let Q ∈ Qt,T and κ ∈ L
∞
+ (Ft) be such that κZ
Q
t,TU(x, T ) ∈ L
1, x ∈ R, and assume
that U˜(x, T ) := 11κ=0U(x, T ) + 11κ>0Z
Q
t,TU(x, T ), x ∈ R, (cf. (7)) satisfies the non-singularity
condition 3.3 in [79]. Then, for any ξ ∈ L∞(Ft),
uQκ (ξ) = inf
η∈L1(Ft)
(
vQκ (η) + 〈ξ, η〉
)
.
Proof. Because Q ∼ P, we have that ZQt,T > 0, P-a.s. Moreover, due to assumption, U˜(x, T ), x ∈ R,
is integrable and satisfies the non-singularity condition. In consequence, Propositions A1 and A3
in [79] can be applied to the auxiliary random utility function8 U˜(x, T ), x ∈ R. Using that on the
set {κ > 0}, U˜(x, T ) = ZQt,TU(x, T ) and V˜ (y, T ) = Z
Q
t,TV
(
y/ZQt,T , T
)
, application of these results
yields
uQκ(ξ) = inf
ζ∗∈Dt,T
(
VQκ (ζ
∗) + 〈ζ∗, ξ〉
)
. (46)
The set Dt,T in (46) can w.l.o.g. be replaced by Dt,T ∩ L1+ (cf. (41)). According to (40), for each
ζ∗ ∈ Dt,T ∩ L1+, there exist η ∈ L
1
+(Ft) and Zt,T ∈ Z
a
T such that
〈ζ∗, ξ〉 = E [ηZt,T ξ] = E [ηξ] = 〈η, ξ〉, for all ξ ∈ L
∞(Ft).
Hence, ζ∗ ∈ Dηt,T . Conversely, D
η
t,T ⊆ Dt,T , for η ∈ L
1
+. In consequence, it follows from (46) that
uQκ (ξ) = inf
η∈L1
+
(Ft)
inf
ζ∗∈Dη
t,T
(
VQκ (ζ
∗) + 〈η, ξ〉
)
= inf
η∈L1
+
(Ft)
(
vQκ (η) + 〈ξ, η〉
)
.
Since vQκ (η) = ∞ for η ∈ L
1(Ft) \ L1+(Ft), the infimum may be taken over L
1(Ft). We easily
conclude.
The next result is the present setting’s analogue of Lemma 4.6 in [71] and is proven by use of the
same lopsided minimax theorem. Together with Lemma 5.2, it is the cornerstone of the proof of
the duality relation in Proposition 5.4 below.
Lemma 5.3. Assume that Qt,T is weakly compact and that U(x, t) and γ satisfy Assumption 1.
Then,
sup
g∈Ct,T
inf
Z∈Qt,T
E
[
κ
(
ZU (ξ + g, T )+ γt,T (Z)
)]
= inf
Z∈Qt,T
sup
g∈Ct,T
E
[
κ
(
ZU (ξ + g, T )+ γt,T (Z)
)]
. (47)
8Note that although ZQ
t,T
U(x, T ) ∈ L1, it is not a priori clear whether ZQt,sU(s, x) ∈ L
1(Fs), for t < s < T .
Hence, it is not clear whether the associated random field is actually a utility field in the sense of Definition 2.1 (the
field could easily be adjusted in order for the utility and path regularity conditions to hold). However, Proposition
A1 in [79] only makes use of the slice U(x, T ) and can therefore be applied under the given assumptions.
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Proof. For given ξ ∈ L∞(Ft) and g ∈ Ct,T , there exists a > 0 such that ξ + g ≥ −a a.s. Hence,
U(ξ + g, T ) ≥ U(−a, T ). For a sequence (Zn)n∈N, Zn ∈ Qt,T , such that Zn → Z a.s., we then use
Fatou’s Lemma to obtain
lim inf
n→∞
E
[
κZn
(
U(ξ + g, T ) + U−(−a, T )
)]
≥ E
[
κZ
(
U(ξ + g, T ) + U−(−a, T )
)]
. (48)
Since {ZnU−(−a, T )}, Zn ∈ Qt,T , is uniformly integrable due to Assumption 1, it follows that
lim
n→∞
E
[
κZnU
−(−a, T )
]
= E
[
κZU−(−a, T )
]
,
and, thus, (48) implies that the function Z → E[κZU(ξ+g, T )] is lower semicontinuous with respect
to a.s.-convergence on Qt,T . As Qt,T is convex and weakly compact, it is uniformly integrable.
Hence, the mapping Z → E[κZU(ξ+g, T )] is lower semicontinuous also with respect to convergence
in L1. This, in turn, yields weak lower semicontinuity as the function is convex (affine).
According to Definition 2.2, Z → E[κγt,T (Z)] is also convex and weakly lower semicontinuous on
Qt,T , which is convex and weakly compact due to Assumption 1. On the other hand, for each
Z ∈ Qt,T , g → E[κZU(ξ + g)] is concave on the convex set Ct,T . Applying the lopsided minimax
theorem (cf. Chapter 6 in [4]), we obtain the desired result.
The next result establishes the conjugacy relations between uκ and vκ. This is the key result upon
which the proof on the conditional versions in Theorem 3.2 relies. The proof uses arguments similar
to the ones used in [71]. However, while the arguments in [71] rely of the duality results in [54], we
here make use of Lemma 5.2.
Proposition 5.4. Assume that Qt,T is weakly compact and that U(x, t) and γ satisfy Assumption
1. Then, for all ξ ∈ L∞(Ft) and η ∈ L1+(Ft), it holds that
uκ(ξ) = inf
η∈L1(Ft)
(
vκ(η) + 〈ξ, η〉
)
and vκ(η) = sup
ξ∈L∞(Ft)
(
uκ(ξ)− 〈ξ, η〉
)
.
Proof. From Lemma 5.3 we obtain
uκ(ξ) = sup
g∈Ct,T
inf
Q∈Qt,T
E
[
κ
(
ZQt,TU (ξ + g, T ) + γt,T (Q)
)]
= inf
Q∈Qt,T
(
sup
g∈Ct,T
E
[
κZQt,TU (ξ + g, T )
]
+ E
[
κγt,T (Q)
])
= inf
Q∈Qt,T
(
uQκ (ξ) + E
[
κγt,T (Q)
])
. (49)
Note that if U(x0, T ) ∈ L1 for some x0 ∈ R, then U(x, T ) ∈ L1 for all x ∈ R. Indeed, due to
concavity, for x < x0 < y with λx + (1− λ)y = x0, it holds that
λE [U (x, T )] + (1 − λ)E [U (y, T )] ≤ E
[
U
(
x0, T
)]
.
Since P ∈ Qt,T and U(x, T ) ∈ L1 due to assumption, we can w.l.o.g. replace the set Qt,T in (49) by
Qκt,T :=
{
Q ∈ Qt,T : κZ
Q
t,TU(x, T ) ∈ L
1
}
. (50)
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Due to Assumption 1, we may then apply Lemma 5.2 for each Q ∈ Qκt,T , to obtain
uκ(ξ) = inf
Q∈Qκt,T
(
inf
η∈L1(Ft)
(
vQκ (η) + 〈ξ, η〉
)
+ E [κγt,T (Q)]
)
= inf
η∈L1(Ft)
(
inf
Q∈Qκ
t,T
(
vQκ (η) + E [κγt,T (Q)]
)
+ 〈ξ, η〉
)
= inf
η∈L1(Ft)
(
vκ(η) + 〈ξ, η〉
)
,
where it remains to argue the last step. To this end, note that for each ζ∗ ∈ Dηt,T , η ∈ L
1(Ft), it
holds that
E
[
κZQt,TV
(
ζ∗/κZQt,T , T
)]
+ E[ξη] ≥ E
[
κZQt,T
(
U (ξ + g, T )− ζ∗(ξ + g)/κZQt,T
)]
+ E[ξη]
= E
[
κZQt,TU (ξ + g, T )
]
− E [ζ∗(ξ + g)] + E[ξη]
≥ E
[
κZQt,TU (ξ + g, T )
]
.
Hence, it follows that Qκt,T can be replaced by Qt,T without loss of generality. This completes the
proof of the first conjugacy relation. To argue that vκ is the convex conjugate of uκ it, thus, suffices
to argue that vκ is convex and weakly lower semicontinuous. This follows from Proposition 5.1 and
we conclude.
5.1.3 Proof of Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 3.3
We prove the main results in Section 3.2. To this end, we follow the same procedure as in [79] and
reduce, by taking expectations, the problem to one involving the F0-measurable value functions uκ
and vκ. The results then follow from Propositions 3.3 and 5.4 above.
First, we establish the existence of a dual optimizer.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Let κ := (max(1, v(η; t, T ))−1 ∈ κ ∈ L∞(Ft). Note that κ takes values
in [0, 1] and w.l.o.g., we may assume that {κ > 0} 6= ∅. Let (ζ¯∗, Q¯) be a minimzer of vk(η), whose
existence is ensured by Proposition 5.1. W.l.o.g., let {ζ¯∗ > 0} ⊆ {κ > 0}. Observe that vκ(η) <∞
due to the definition of κ. Therefore, VQ¯κ (ζ¯
∗) < ∞ and, in turn, (41) yields that ζ¯∗ ∈ L1. Hence,
ζ¯∗ ∈ Dt,T ∩ L1+ and, thus, according to (40) there exists Z¯ ∈ Z
a
T such that ζ¯
∗ = ηZ¯t,T . In order to
show that (Q¯, Z¯t,T ) attains the essential infimum in (6), we argue by contradiction. To this end,
assume that there exist ε > 0, Q′ ∈ Qt,T , Z ′t,T ∈ Z
a
T and a set B ∈ Ft with P(B) > 0, such that
EQ
′
[
V
(
ηZ ′t,T /Z
Q′
t,T , T
) ∣∣∣Ft]+ γt,T (Q′) + ε < EQ¯[V (ηZ¯t,T /ZQ¯t,T , T) ∣∣∣Ft]+ γt,T (Q¯) on B. (51)
Note that B ⊆ {κ > 0}. Moreover, w.l.o.g. (scaling if necessary), we may choose B such that
B ⊆ {κ = 1}. Let the random variable ζ˜∗ ∈ L1 be given by ζ˜∗ := η(Z ′t,T 11B + Z¯t,T 11Bc). It follows
that ζ˜∗ ∈ Dt,T and, thus, ζ˜∗ = ηZ˜t,T for some Z˜t,T ∈ ZaT . Taking expectations on both side of (51)
then yields
VQ˜κ (ζ˜
∗) + E
[
κγt,T (Q˜)
]
− εP(B) ≤ VQ¯κ (ζ¯
∗) + E
[
κγt,T (Q¯)
]
,
which contradicts the choice of (ζ¯∗, Q¯) as the minimizer.
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Next, in order to reduce the conditional conjugacy relations to the F0-measurable case, we establish
an auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 5.5. For fixed g ∈ Ct,T and ξ ∈ L∞(FT ), it holds that
E
[
ess inf
Q∈Qt,T
κ
(
E
[
ZQt,TU (ξ + g, T )
∣∣∣Ft]+ γt,T (Q))
]
= inf
Q∈Qt,T
E
[
κ
(
ZQt,TU (ξ + g, T ) + γt,T (Q)
)]
.
(52)
Proof. The inequality ’≤’ is trivial. To show the reverse inequality, let
J(Q) := κE
[
ZQt,TU (ξ + g, T )
∣∣∣Ft]+ κγt,T (Q), Q ∈ Qt,T .
Note that P ∈ Qt,T . Moreover, since U(x, T ) ∈ L1 due to assumption, it holds that
J(P) = κE [U (ξ + g, T ) |Ft] + κγt,T (P) ∈ L
1(Ft).
Hence, w.l.o.g. the set Qt,T in the left hand side of (52) can be replaced by Q˜t,T := {Q ∈ Qt,T :
J(Q) ∈ L1(Ft)}.
Next, we claim that the set
{
J(Q)|Q ∈ Q˜t,T
}
is directed downwards. Indeed, let Q1, Q2 ∈ Q˜t,T
and define A := {J(Q1) ≤ J(Q2)} ∈ Ft. Let Q¯ given by
dQ¯
dP = 11AZ
Q1
T + 11AcZ
Q2
T . According to
Lemma 3.3 in [31], Q¯ ∈ Qt,T and, furthermore,
J(Q¯) = κE
[(
11AZ
Q1
t,T + 11AcZ
Q2
t,T
)
U (ξ + g, T )
∣∣∣Ft]+ κγt,T (Q¯)
= κ11A
(
EQ1 [U (ξ + g, T ) |Ft] + γt,T (Q1)
)
+ κ11Ac
(
EQ2 [U (ξ + g, T ) |Ft] + γt,t(Q2)
)
= 11AJ(Q1) + 11AcJ(Q2) = min{J(Q1), J(Q2)}.
In particular, this implies that Q¯ ∈ Q˜t,T . Consequently, it also follows that
{
J(Q)|Q ∈ Q˜t,T
}
is
closed under minimization and so directed downwards. Hence, due to Neveu [66], there exists a
sequence Qn ∈ Q˜t,T such that J(Qn) is decreasing and
ess inf
Q∈Q˜t,T
J(Q) = lim
n→∞
J(Qn).
Use of the monotone convergence theorem then yields that
E
[
ess inf
Q∈Q˜t,T
J(Q)
]
= E
[
lim
n→∞
↓ J(Qn)
]
= lim
n→∞
E [J(Qn)] ≥ inf
Q∈Q˜t,T
E [J(Q)] .
Using the above and the fact that Q˜t,T ⊆ Qt,T , we obtain
E
[
ess inf
Q∈Qt,T
J(Q)
]
= E
[
ess inf
Q∈Q˜t,T
J(Q)
]
≥ inf
Q∈Q˜t,T
E
[
J(Q)
]
≥ inf
Q∈Qt,T
E
[
J(Q)
]
,
and we easily conclude.
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We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.2. We argue by contradiction, assuming that the conditional
conjugacy relations does not hold. Taking expectations and applying Lemma 5.5, it then follows
that the F0-measurable conjugacy relations between uκ and vκ are violated. In consequence, we
may apply Proposition 5.4 to obtain a contradiction and conclude.
Proof of relation (8) in Theorem 3.2. First, we show that the inequality ’≤’ holds. To this end,
note that for fixed g¯ ∈ Ct,T and Q¯ ∈ Qt,T , it trivially holds that
ess inf
Q∈Qt,T
(
EQ [U(ξ + g¯, T )| Ft] + γt,T (Q)
)
≤ ess sup
g∈Ct,T
EQ¯ [U(ξ + g, T )| Ft] + γt,T (Q¯),
with ξ ∈ L∞(Ft) and η ∈ L1+(Ft). Thus, it is immediate that
u(ξ; t, T ) ≤ ess inf
Q∈Qt,T
(
ess sup
g∈Ct,T
EQ [U(ξ + g, T )| Ft] + γt,T (Q)
)
. (53)
Next, for any Q ∈ MaT , we have that S is a local martingale and, thus, so is the process
∫ t
0 πudSu,
for all π ∈ Abd. Recall that for all π ∈ Abd, there exists a > 0 such that
∫ t
0 πudSu > −a, t ≤ T . It
follows that EQ[g] ≤ 0, for all g ∈ Ct,T . In turn, since U(x, T ) ≤ V (y, T ) + xy, for all x ∈ R, y ≥ 0,
it follows that
EQ
[
U(ξ + g, T )| Ft
]
≤ EQ
[
V
(
ηZt,T /Z
Q
t,T , T
)∣∣∣Ft]+ E[ (ξ + g)ηZt,T | Ft]
≤ EQ
[
V
(
ηZt,T /Z
Q
t,T , T
)∣∣∣Ft]+ ξη a.s.,
for all Q ∈ Qt,T , Zt,T ∈ Z
a
T , ξ ∈ L
∞(Ft), g ∈ Ct,T and η ∈ L
1
+(Ft). In combination with (53), this
implies that
u(ξ; t, T ) ≤ ess inf
Q∈Qt,T
(
ess inf
Z∈ZaT
EQ
[
V
(
ηZt,T /Z
Q
t,T , T
)∣∣∣Ft]+ ξη + γt,T (Q)
)
= v(η; t, T ) + ξη,
for all η ∈ L1+(Ft). This completes the proof of the first inequality.
To prove the reverse inequality, we argue by contradiction and assume that there exist ξ ∈ L∞(Ft),
ε > 0 and A ∈ Ft such that
ess inf
Q∈Qt,T
(
EQ [U(ξ + g, T )| Ft] + γt,T (Q)
)
+ ε11A ≤ E
Q
[
V
(
ηZt,T /Z
Q
t,T , T
)∣∣∣Ft]+ γt,T (Q) + ξη,
for all g ∈ Kt,T , Zt,T ∈ Z
a
T , Q ∈ Qt,T and η ∈ L
1
+(Ft). Observe that u(ξ; t, T ) <∞ a.s. on A and,
w.l.o.g., we may assume that there is M < ∞ such that u(ξ; t, T ) ≤ M a.s. on A. Since κ = 1/κ
on A, it follows by multiplying the above inequality by κ = 11A, taking expectations on both sides
and applying Lemma 5.5, that
inf
Q∈Qt,T
E
[
κ
(
ZQt,TU(ξ+g, T )+γt,T (Q)
)]
+εP (A) ≤ E
[
κZQt,TV
(
η
κ
Zt,T
ZQt,T
, T
)]
+E [κγt,T (Q)]+E [κξη] ,
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where the expression in the first expectation on the right hand side is defined to be zero on Ac.
According to (40), we have that for every ζ∗ ∈ Dηt,T ∩ L
1
+ with η ∈ L
1
+(Ft), there exists Zt,T ∈ Z
a
T
such that ζ∗ = ηZt,T . Using this and taking the supremum over g ∈ Kt,T , we deduce that
uκ(ξ) + εP (A) ≤ V
Q
κ (ζ
∗) + E [κγt,T (Q)] + 〈ξ, η〉, (54)
for all η ∈ L1+(Ft) such that η = η11A, Q ∈ Qt,T and ζ
∗ ∈ Dηt,T ∩ L
1
+. In consequence, for any
η ∈ L1+(Ft) and Q ∈ Qt,T , the above inequality holds for all ζ
∗ ∈ Dηt,T . Indeed, if ζ
∗ /∈ L1+ or
η 6= η11A, then it holds that VQκ (ζ
∗) =∞ (cf. (41)). Hence,
uκ(ξ) + εP (A) ≤ v
Q
κ (η) + E [κγt,T (Q)] + 〈ξ, η〉,
for all η ∈ L1+(Ft) and Q ∈ Qt,T and. Thus, in turn, since uκ(ξ) ≤M <∞ due to the above choice
of κ, we obtain
uκ(ξ) < uκ(ξ) + εP (A) ≤ inf
η∈L1(Ft)
(vκ(η) + 〈ξ, η〉) .
According to Proposition 5.4 we have, thus, obtained a contradiction and we easily conclude.
Proof of relation (9) in Theorem 3.2. The assertion (8) implies that for all η ∈ L1(Ft) and ξ ∈
L∞(Ft), v(η; t, T ) ≥ u(ξ; t, T )− ξη. Hence, the inequality ”≥” follows directly.
To prove the reverse inequality, we argue by contradiction and assume that there exist η ∈ L1+(Ft),
ε > 0 and A ∈ Ft such that
ess inf
Q∈Qt,T
(
EQ [U(ξ + g, T )| Ft] + γt,T (Q)
)
− ξη + ε11A ≤ E
Q
[
V
(
ηZt,T /Z
Q
t,T , T
)∣∣∣Ft]+ γt,T (Q),
for all g ∈ Kt,T , ξ ∈ L∞(Ft), Zt,T ∈ ZaT and Q ∈ Qt,T . Since η might be replaced by η11A without
violating the above inequality, we assume w.l.o.g. that η = 0 on Ac. Next, multiplying the above
inequality by κ = 11A, taking the expectation and using Lemma 5.5 yields
inf
Q∈Qt,T
E
[
κ
(
ZQt,TU(ξ+g, T )+γt,T (Q)
)]
−E [ξη]+εP (A) ≤ E
[
κZQt,TV
(
η
κ
Zt,T
ZQt,T
, T
)]
+E [κγt,T (Q)] .
According to (40), for every ζ∗ ∈ Dηt,T ∩ L
1
+, there exists Zt,T ∈ Z
a
T such that ζ
∗ = ηZt,T . Hence,
it then follows that
uκ(ξ)− 〈ξ, η〉+ εP (A) ≤ V
Q
κ (ζ
∗) + E [γt,T (Q)] ,
for all ξ ∈ L∞(Ft), Q ∈ Qt,T and ζ∗ ∈ D
η
t,T ∩ L
1
+. Since V
Q
κ (ζ
∗) =∞, for any other ζ∗ ∈ Dηt,T , the
above inequality holds for all ξ ∈ L∞(Ft), Q ∈ Qt,T and ζ∗ ∈ D
η
t,T . Therefore,
uκ(ξ)− 〈ξ, η〉 + εP (A) ≤ v
Q
κ (η) + E [γt,T (Q)] ,
for all ξ ∈ L∞(Ft) and Q ∈ Qt,T and, thus, in turn,
sup
ξ∈L∞
(
uκ(ξ)− 〈ξ, η〉
)
< sup
ξ∈L∞
(
uκ(ξ)− 〈ξ, η〉
)
+ εP (A) ≤ vκ(η),
where we used that supξ∈L∞
(
uκ(ξ)−〈ξ, η〉
)
<∞, due to the choice of κ. According to Proposition
5.4 we have, thus, obtained a contradiction and we easily conclude.
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5.2 Proof of Propositions 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8
In order to prove the results in Section 3.3, we first establish two Lemmata.
Lemma 5.6. Let V be a dual random field and γt,T an admissible family of penalty functions such
that either Assumption 2 holds, or (10) holds and v−(ζ; t, T ) ∈ L1(Ft;Q) for all ζ ∈ L0(Ft) and
Q ∈ Q˜0,T , t ≤ T . Then, the dual value field v(·; t, T ) and γt,T are self-generating on [0, T ].
Proof. Fix 0 ≤ s < t < T < ∞. For Q ∈ Q0,T , we use the convention γ0,t(Q) = γ0,t(Q|Ft). Let
Z ∈ Zat and Q ∈ Qs,t. Using Proposition 3.3, we denote by Z
∗ and Q∗ the optimal elements in ZaT
and Qt,T , respectively, for which v
(
ηZs,t/Z
Q
s,t; t, T
)
is attained. Then, it holds that
E
[
ZQs,tv
(
η
Zs,t
ZQs,t
; t, T
)∣∣∣∣∣Fs
]
+ γs,t(Q)
= E
[
ZQs,t
(
E
[
ZQ
∗
t,TV
(
η
Zs,t
ZQs,t
Z∗t,T
ZQ
∗
t,T
, T
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+ γt,T
(
ZQ
∗
t,T
))∣∣∣∣∣Fs
]
+ γs,t(Q)
= E
[
ZQs,tZ
Q∗
t,TV
(
η
Zs,tZ
∗
t,T
ZQs,tZ
Q∗
t,T
, T
)∣∣∣∣∣Fs
]
+ γs,T
(
ZQs,tZ
Q∗
t,T
)
≥ v(η; s, T ), (55)
where it was used that ZtZ
∗
t,T ∈ Z
a
T and that Q¯ ∈ Qs,T , with
dQ¯
dP|FT
= ZQt Z
Q∗
t,T . While this follows
immediately from the fact that Qt,T is stable under pasting under assumption a), it follows from
assumption b) by the following argument: v−(ζ; s, T ) ∈ L1(FT ; Q¯), ζ ∈ L0(FT ), implies (using that
v(η; s, t) is finite) that EQ
[
γt,T (Q
∗) |Fs
]
<∞ and, thus, Q¯ ∈ Qs,T .
Next, let Z ∈ ZaT and Q ∈ Q0,T be the optimal objects for which the infimum in v(η; s, T ) is
attained. Note that due to (10), the fact that Q ∈ Q0,T , yields Q ∈ Qt,T and Q|Ft ∈ Qs,t. Hence,
it follows that
v(η; s, T ) = E
[
ZQs,TV
(
η
Zs,T
ZQs,T
, T
)∣∣∣∣∣Fs
]
+ γs,T
(
ZQs,T
)
= E
[
ZQs,t
(
E
[
ZQt,TV
(
η
Zs,t
ZQs,t
Zt,T
ZQt,T
, T
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+ γt,T
(
ZQt,T
))∣∣∣∣∣Fs
]
+ γs,t(Q)
≥ E
[
ZQs,tv
(
η
Zs,t
ZQs,t
; t, T
)∣∣∣∣∣Fs
]
+ γs,t(Q) ≥ v(η; s, T ), (56)
where the last inequality is due to (55). In consequence, equality must hold, which combined with
(55) yields
v(η; s, T ) = ess inf
Q∈Qs,t
ess inf
Z∈Zat
{
EQ
[
v
(
η
Zs,t
ZQs,t
; t, T
)∣∣∣∣∣Fs
]
+ γs,t(Q)
}
.
This completes the proof.
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Lemma 5.7. Let V (y, t) be a random field associated with a utility random field (cf. (5)), and let
γt,T a family of penalty functions satisfying (10). Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
i) V (y, t) and γt,T are self-generating.
ii) For each y > 0 and all t ≤ T <∞,
V (yZt/Z
Q
t , t) ≤ E
Q
[
V (yZT /Z
Q
T , T )
∣∣∣Ft]+ γt,T (Q), (57)
for all Q ∈ Qt,T and Z ∈ ZaT . Moreover, for each T¯ > 0, there exists Q¯ ∈ Q0,T¯ and Z¯ ∈ Z
a
T ,
such that (57) holds with equality for all t ≤ T ≤ T¯ .
Furthermore, if either a) the set Q0,T = Q˜0,T , T > 0, or b) for any T > 0 and all ζ ∈ L0(FT ),
V −(ζ, T ) ∈ L1(FT ;Q) for all Q ∈ Q˜0,T , then i) and ii) are equivalent to the following condition:
iii) For each y > 0 and all t ≤ T <∞, (57) holds for all Q ∈ Qt,T and Z ∈ ZaT . Moreover, there
is a Z ∈ Za and a sequence
(
QT i
)
, i ∈ N, with QT i = QT i+1 |FTi and QT := QT i |FT ∈ Q0,T ,
T i ≥ T , such that for all 0 < t < T <∞, (57) holds with equality for QT and ZT .
Proof. First, we show that i) implies ii). To this end, assume that V is self-generating, namely, for
any T > 0 and t ≤ T , it holds that
V (η, t) = ess inf
Q∈Qt,T
ess inf
Z∈Za
T
{
EQ
[
V
(
ηZt,T /Z
Q
t,T , T
)∣∣∣Ft]+ γt,T (Q)}, η ∈ L0+.
Let y > 0, Z˜ ∈ ZaT and Q˜ ∈ Qt,T . Further, let η := yZ˜t/Z
Q˜
t . Then, it follows that
V (yZ˜t/Z
Q˜
t , t) = ess inf
Q∈Qt,T
ess inf
Z∈Za
T
{
EQ
[
V
(
y
Z˜tZt,T
ZQ˜t Z
Q
t,T
, T
)∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+ γt,T (Q)
}
≤ EQ˜
[
V
(
yZ˜T/Z
Q˜
T , T
) ∣∣Ft]+ γt,T (Q˜),
which yields (57). Next, let Z¯ ∈ Za
T¯
and Q¯ ∈ Q0,T¯ the optimal objects for which v(y, 0; T¯ ) is
attained; their existence is ensured by Proposition 3.3. Let ZT := E[Z¯|FT ] and QT := Q¯|FT . Note
that Q¯ ∈ Q0,T¯ , implies that Q¯T ∈ Q0,T and Q¯ ∈ QT,T¯ . Hence, by use of the same arguments as
in (56) (which makes use of (10)) combined with the fact that V (y, t) and γ are self-generating, it
follows that
v(y; 0, T¯ ) = EQ¯
[
V
(
yZ¯T¯ /Z
Q¯
T¯
, T¯
)]
+ γ0,T¯ (Q¯)
≥ EQ¯
[
v
(
yZ¯T /Z
Q¯
T ;T, T¯
)]
+ γ0,T (Q¯) ≥ v(y; 0, T ). (58)
By once again using the property of self-generation, it follows that (58) must hold with equality.
In consequence, v(y; 0, T ) is attained for ZT and QT , T ≤ T¯ . We now argue that for t ≤ T ≤ T¯ ,
(57) holds as equality for Z¯ and Q¯. To this end, assume contrary to the claim that there is ε > 0
and A ∈ Ft, P(A) > 0, such that
V (yZ¯t/Z
Q¯
t , t) + ǫ11A ≤ E
Q¯
[
V (yZ¯T /Z
Q¯
T , T )
∣∣∣Ft]+ γt,T (Q¯).
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Taking the expectation under Q¯ and using (10) we, then, obtain
EQ¯
[
V (yZ¯t/Z
Q¯
t , t)
]
+ γ0,t(Q¯) + ǫQ¯(A) ≤ E
Q¯
[
V (yZ¯T /Z
Q¯
T , T )
]
+ γ0,T (Q¯). (59)
However, due to the above, v(y; 0, t) is attained for Z¯t = Z
t and ZQ¯t = Z
Qt
t . Hence, we obtain the
contradiction v(y; 0, t) < v(y; 0, T ) which completes the proof of the claim.
In order to prove that ii) implies i), it suffices to show that, for any 0 < t < T <∞ and η ∈ L0+(Ft),
it holds that
V (η, t) ≤ EQ
[
V
(
ηZt,T /Z
Q
t,T , T
)∣∣Ft]+ γt,T (Q), (60)
for all Q ∈ Qt,T and Z ∈ ZaT and that there exists some Qˆ ∈ Qt,T and Zˆ ∈ Z
a
T for which
equality holds. Note that (57) implies that for a simple, positive and Ft-measurable random variable
η˜ =
∑n
k=1 yk11Ak , we have that
V (η˜Zt/Z
Q
t , t) ≤ E
Q
[
V (η˜ZT /Z
Q
T , T )
∣∣∣Ft]+ γt,T (Q), (61)
for all Q ∈ Qt,T and Z ∈ ZaT . Using similar arguments to the ones used in the proof of Theorem
3.14 in [79], this implies that (61) holds for arbitrary η˜ ∈ L0+(Ft). For any Q ∈ Qt,T and Z ∈ Z
a
T ,
(60) is then obtained by letting η˜ = ηZQt /Zt. Equality in (60) follows by a similar argument where
all the inequalities become equalities by the choice of QT ∈ Qt,T and ZT ∈ ZaT for which (57) holds
with equality.
Next, we show the equivalence between i) and iii). Given a sequence as specified in iii), part ii) holds
trivially. Hence, it only remains to show that i) implies iii). To this end, let T1 < T2. Further, let
Z1 ∈ ZaT1 and Q1 ∈ QT1 be the optimal arguments for which v(y; 0, T1) is attained; their existence
is ensured by Proposition 3.3. In turn, let Q∗ ∈ QT2 and Z
∗ ∈ ZT2 be the optimal arguments for
which v
(
yZ1T1/Z
Q1
T1
;T1, T2
)
is attained, and define Q2 and Z
2 as follows:
dQ2
dP|FT2
= ZQ1T1 Z
Q∗
T1,T2
and Z2 = Z1T1Z
∗
T1,T2 .
By use of the same argument as in (55) (which makes use of (10) and (11)) combined with the fact
that V (y, t) and γ are self-generating, it follows that Z2 ∈ ZaT2 , Q2 ∈ Q0,T2 and that
v(y; 0, T1) = E
[
ZQ
1
T1
ZQ
∗
T1,T2
V
(
y
Z1T1Z
∗
T1,T2
ZQ
1
T1
ZQ
∗
T1,T2
, T2
)]
+ γ0,T2
(
ZQ1T1 Z
Q∗
T1,T2
)
(62)
= EQ
2
[
V
(
yZ2T2/Z
Q2
T2
, T2
)]
+ γ0,T2
(
Q2
)
≥ v(y; 0, T2).
In consequence, equality must hold and, thus, v(y; 0, T2) is attained for Z
2 and Q2. As argued
above (cf. (56)), it follows for any T < T2, that v(y; 0, T ) is attained for Z = Z
2
T and Q = Q2|FT .
Subsequent repetition of the above pasting procedure then yields Z ∈ Za and a sequence
(
QT i
)
,
i ∈ N, with QT i = QT i+1 |FTi and QT := QT i |FT ∈ Q0,T , T
i ≥ T , such that for all T > 0, v(y; 0, T )
is attained for ZT and QT . In turn, by once again using arguments similar to the ones used to show
that i) implies ii), we obtain that for any t < T <∞, (57) holds as equality for ZT and QT . Hence,
iii) holds and we conclude.
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We now argue how the results in Section 3.3 follow from the above Lemmata. First, Theorem 3.2
and Lemma 5.6 readily yield Proposition 3.6. Further, according to Proposition 3.9 in [79], the fact
that U(x, T ) ∈ L1(FT ,Q) for all Q ∈ Q˜0,T , T > 0, implies that assumption b) of Lemma 5.7 holds.
Hence, combined with Theorem 3.2, Lemma 5.7 yields Proposition 3.8.
Next, we argue Proposition 3.7. W.l.o.g., let t = 0. By use of the same arguments as in the proof
of Lemma 5.7 (see i implies iii), it follows that there is Z ∈ Za and a sequence
(
Q¯T i
)
, i ∈ N,
with Q¯T i = Q¯T i+1 |FTi and Q¯T := Q¯T i |FT ∈ Q0,T , T ≤ T
i, such that, for all T ≥ 0, v(y; 0, T ) is
attained for ZT and Q¯T . Due to the existence of a saddle-point and the duality between u(·; 0, T )
and v(·; 0, T ), it follows (cf. Theorem 2.6 in [71]) that for each x ∈ R, there is Z ∈ Za and a
sequence
(
Q¯T i
)
satisfying the above, such that
u(x; 0, T ) = ess sup
pi∈A
EQ¯
[
U
(
x+
∫ T
0
πsdSs, T
)]
+ γ0,T (Q¯).
By use of (10), the time–consistency now follows as for the classical utility maximization problem.
For completeness, we argue this. To this end, let T ≤ T¯ . It follows that (cf. (58)),
u(x, 0; T¯ ) = EQ¯
[
EQ¯
[
U
(
x+
∫ T¯
0
π¯0,T¯s dSs, T¯
)
|FT
]
+ γT,T¯ (Q¯)
]
+ γ0,T (Q¯)
≤ EQ¯
[
u
(
x+
∫ T
0
π¯0,T¯s dSs, T ; T¯
)]
+ γ0,T (Q¯) ≤ u(x, 0;T ).
In consequence, equality must hold and, thus, π¯0,T0 = π¯
0,T¯
0 . Next, let u ≤ T and assume contrary
to the claim that there is ε > 0 and A ∈ Fu such that
EQ¯
[
U
(
x+
∫ T
0
π¯0,Ts dSs, T
)
|Fu
]
+ γu,T (Q¯) + ε11A ≤ u
(
x+
∫ u
0
π¯0,Ts dSs, u;T
)
. (63)
Taking expectations under Q¯, using that U and γ are self-generating and that γ satisfies (10), then
yields (cf. (59)),
EQ¯
[
U
(
x+
∫ T
0
π¯0,Ts dSs, T
)]
+ γ0,T (Q¯) < E
Q¯
[
U
(
x+
∫ u
0
π¯0,Ts dSs, u
)]
+ γ0,u(Q¯), (64)
which yields the contradiction u(x, 0;T ) < u(x, 0;u). Similarly, assuming the reverse strict inequal-
ity in (63), yields a contradiction. We easily conclude.
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